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an interregional system of superhighways and to those who
brought this concept into reality.
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Ripple, David Alan. Ph.D., Purdue University, December, 1973.
The History of the Interstate Highway System in Indiana.
Major Professor: Harold L. Michael.
This work is a reconstruction of the planning, develop-
ment and implementation of the Interstate Highway Program
in Indiana as well as the Nation. The historical data for
this record was gathered from Federal reports, documents,
and legislation; Federal Highway Administration documents
and interviews; Indiana State Highway Commission records and
interviews; and other transportation related agency reports
and interviews throughout Indiana.
Because of the voluminous amount of data involved, a
combination of the stages of the systems analysis process
and the highway planning and programming process \vas used
in the reconstruction and presentation of the historical
record.
The work begins with a description of the traditional
role of transportation in the economy and the role of gover-
nment in highway development. The need for an interregional
super highway system and the goals and objectives of the
Interstate Program are documented.
The development of the Interstate Program is traced
from its conception in the late 1939's to the landmark leg-
islation in 1956. The highway needs and programs developed
by numerous studies during this period are described in detail
The Interstate Program as set forth by the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1956 and its evolution are described in terms
of policies on construction time, the utilization of manpower,
the use of material and equipment, and financing. Under
XXV111
financing, the report covers in great depth the apportion-
ment of funds, federal participation, the use of funds,
administrative policy, right-of-way acquisition, the inclu-
sion of toll roads in the Interstate System and the reim-
bursement to States for completed Interstate sections.
All programs are subject to an evolution in policies
and standards which ultimately affect the ultimate product.
The research covers Interstate route location and selection,
the route alternative evaluation process, the public hearing
process, the A-95 Review Process (Project Notification and
Review Process), the decision-making process and interagency
cooperation, the environmental statement process and highway
impact guidelines, policies on multiple use and joint deve-
lopment, the evolution of design standards with a heavy
emphasis on safety in design, the evolution of interchange
location and spacing, federal policies on fund participation,
the evolution of landscape design including billboard and
junkyard control, the evolution of the land acquisition pro-
cess and the relocation process and other processes and
policies
.
Leaving the national scene, the work concentrates on
designation of the Interstate Routes in Indiana, the formu-
lation of the Indiana Interstate Program, and the historical
development of the Indiana System. A description of studies
and events leading to the development of each Interstate
Route is covered in great detail.
Finally, the report assesses the relationship between
revenues, expenditures, and cost completion estimates on
the Interstate System. The progress of the Indiana System
toward completion is documented on a fiscal year basis. A
gross overview of the benefits and impacts of Interstate de-




Never before in the history of mankind has there been a
transportation program of such magnitude as the Interstate
Highway System. The program is even more unique in that it
created an entirely new highway system superimposed over the
existing systems. Unlike the traditional Federal and State
highway programs which are concerned with the improvement,
upgrading and extension of existing highways and are contin-
uous in nature, the Interstate Program was to be completed
in a finite time span. Because the Interstate System is new,
an opportunity was afforded to systematically plan it.
In such planning , the role of the new system in fulfilling
the nation's transportation needs was first defined. To
insure fulfillment of the new system's role, new standards of
design and location were developed.
Although the Program was not constrained by the limita-
tions of the existing systems, it was still confined by the
limited financial resources of the nation. To insure the
financial success of the Program, the planners gave consider-
ation to the total productivity of the United States, the
general level of expenditures on highways, and the amount of
revenue available. This was one of the first attempts in
highway capital improvement to balance the flow of revenues
and expenditures. Because of the size and complexity of the
Interstate Program, the task of developing and implementing
the Program was equally complex.
When programs of such monumental importance occur, it
is essential that a historical record be made of the activity
so that transportation policy-makers, administrators, engi-
neers, and planners benefit from this past experience in
the development and execution of future programs, and so that
the achievement is appreciated by posterity. The benefits
derived from such a record may be virtually unlimited.
The benefits about to be described have many ramifica-
tions and are by no means an exhaustive list. The historical
record will be of value to the Indiana State Highway Commis-
sion (I.S.H.C.) in the area of policies and procedures
which affect the planning, development and implementation
processes. The record describes the state of the art and
the evolution of methods for determining highway needs; basic
criteria for selecting routes and determining route locations;
economic analyses for evaluating projects and systems; project
review systems and public participation; criteria for deter-
mining project priorites; design criteria; and utilization of
manpower, equipment, materials and financial resources.
The record may also cultivate an appreciation by the
general public of the effort undertaken to improve their gen-
eral welfare as well as inform them of the processes of high-
way planning, design and construction. If citizens have
knowledge of what they have received for their tax dollar,
they may be more likely to support highway programs. The
result would be better communication and understanding between
the general public and the Indiana State Highway Commission.
This record will also provide personnel of the Indiana
State Highway Commission with historical data on highway lo-
cation, acquisition procedures, severance damages, relocation
benefits, construction costs, construction priorities, design
modifications, safety features, environmental considerations
and other items which may be used at public hearings on new
facilities beyond the Interstate System. Information on
route location costs and procedures of the past will support
estimates on new routes and reduce opposition at public
hearings.
The record may provide an improved ability to determine
effective procedures for future highway development because
of knowledge of what has occurred in the past. This report
may improve the ability to determine the effective utiliza-
tion of manpower, equipment, time and money. The information
recorded could serve as the basic input for an impact study
and for subsequent history studies. This review may reveal
the effectiveness of the procedures utilized and will serve
as a source of information for evaluating the effectiveness
of meeting Program goals. As of this date, there is no known
comprehensive record of the development of the Interstate
Highway System in Indiana.
In gathering data for this report, it was necessary to
review materials from various sources concerning policies,
procedures, practices, design standards and other criteria
for the Indiana Interstate System. A partial list of the
materials included the access control and location reports
of the Indiana State Highway Commission and its consultants,
procedure manuals and memoranda of the Indiana State Highway
Commission and the Federal Highway Administration, and cor-
respondence between these agencies and the public. This
material was supplemented by interviews with personnel of
the various Divisions of the Indiana State Highway Commission,
including the administrative staff, and personnel of other
agencies involved in the development of the System in Indiana.
This historical record is intended to be an unbiased and
consistent reconstruction of the planning, development, and
implementation of the Interstate Program at the State and
National level. Because the voluminous amount of data gen-
erally defied comprehension, the methodology employed to re-
construct and present the history involves the division of
the Program into several stages. For reasons of consistency
and applicability, the stages are best described as elements
from the combination of the systems analysis process and the
highway planning and programming process. This report is
organized in a manner consistent with the stages of these
processes
.
The first stage (Chapter II, Interstate Highway Goals
and Needs) covers the recognition of the need for a vastly
improved highway system and the establishment of goals for
such an improvement. Goals for the Interstate Program pro-
vide a sense of direction and serve as a measure of attain-
ment for the Program. Federal legislation and studies pro-
vided most of the goals for the Interstate Highway Program.
Modifications, additions and elaborations of the Federal
goals by the State appear to be very minor.
Chapter III describes the investigation of various con-
cepts to accomplish the goals. Numerous studies attempted
to determine the deficiencies of the existing highway system
and to formulate a concept for correcting these and future
deficiencies of the system. All the studies recommended
the creation of an entirely new highway system, over and
above the existing primary, secondary and State systems, as
the best concept to attain the goals.
The next stage (Chapter IV, The Program and Its Evalua-
tion) considers the means chosen to accomplish the established
goals, given that the creation of a new system is the best
concept to attain the goals. The means involves statements
or policies on the amount of time allocated for construction
of the System, the amount of manpower utilized including the
level of effort and source of labor, the amount of materials
and equipment required including their availability and source,
the methods used in financing the program, and the general
design criteria established. These statements set forth
standards which insured the effective utilization of the re-
sources available to accomplish the goals.
The Program is the embodiment of these statements into
a plan which insured a constant flow of resources to accomp-
lish the task. If the resources were inadequate, the Program
set forth policies to overcome the deficiencies. Furthermore,
the Program scheduled expenditures on the improvement to match
the flow of revenues and suggested means to overcome any re-
venue deficiencies to insure the constant flow of monies.
Excerpts from Federal legislation and studies provide most
of the information on changes in the initial Program.
Because policies and standards of the Program vary over
time and ultimately affect the end product (the Interstate
Highway System) , Chapter V (Evolution of Policies and
Standards) describes the evolution of regulations and crit-
eria as well as their effect on the Interstate Program.
Federal and State documents and personnel interviews provide
information on the evolution of general design policies and
standards. The chapter includes the evolution of corridor
selection and route location criteria, the methodology used
to evaluate alternate locations and designs, the highway de-
sign and construction processes, and the criteria for estab-
lishing construction priorities.
Chapter VI, The Route History, is a reconstruction of
the implementation of the Interstate Program. This stage is
a what, when and where reconstruction of the histories of
Indiana Interstate routes. The route location studies, public
hearings, access control studies, design processes, and con-
struction processes are retraced on each route. In reconstruct-
ing the events and activities, one must recognize that the
resolution of the events was based on the knowledge available
at that time and other limitations or constraints. This record
is not a critique of decisions made in the past, nor is it an
attempt to evaluate decisions of the past by the policies,
procedures, knowledge, criteria, and regulations of today.
The reader is cautioned to evaluate events in the context
of their own time. Such an attempt has been made to recon-
struct events in this record.
Program Review (Chapter VII) is an overview and summary
of the implementation of the Interstate Program in Indiana.
This stage reviews the expenditures and status of the Program
so as to measure how effectively the Program goals have been
met. This chapter describes the intergovernmental coopera-
tion that occurred during the Interstate program; the progress
of the Interstate toward completion; the various estimates
of cost to complete the System; the evolution of costs; actual
costs; the influence of funding on the Interstate Program;
and the level of effort by Indiana State Highway Commission
personnel and consultants.
The Conclusion (Chapter VIII) sets forth the benefits of
the Interstate Program in Indiana as a measure of return for
the expenditure. This is a gross overview of the benefits
that have and will continue to accrue to Hoosiers due to the
improvement of transportation through the Interstate System.
The conclusion also contains a summary of the evolution of
the Interstate Program and the standards by which it was de-
veloped. This is to impress on the reader that the Program
was not implemented in a vacuum or state of equilibruim,
but that it was implemented in a state of flux and was it-
self subject to the flux.
As the Interstate Highway System in Indiana will not be
completed at the time this report is made, this historical
report will only be the first phase of a complete record.
However, this report is primary in nature and only a few
additions will be needed to update it once the System is
completed. Although December 31, 1971, is the cutoff date
for the first phase of the historical report, data as current
as possible was utilized to minimize the revisions necessary
for a final report after the Interstate System is completed.
CHAPTER II
THE NEED FOR AN INTERSTATE HIGHWAY
SYSTEM AND INTERSTATE SYSTEM GOALS
Before any capital improvement is undertaken, the need
for such an improvement must first be recognized. In the
process of defining the general need and developing general
goals to satisfy the need, knowledge of how the need arose
and an understanding of its context in time are useful.
The Traditional Role of Transportation
Transportation is one essential ingredient of urbaniza-
tion and commerce. In our early agrarian society where a
subsistence economy existed, there was little commodity ex-
change and, therefore, little need for transportation to fa-
cilitate exchange.
As improved farming technique created a surplus of es-
sentials, some people were released from the land and allowed
to devote their full time and talents to the production of
goods needed by the farmer. Thus, the specialization which
began resulted in increased economics of scale in commerce
and industry and changed social habits for human beings.
Transportation provided the means of moving the farm surplus
to central places where the surplus could be aggregated and
utilized. Those released from the farm gravitated to these
central places where they could have access to the essential
commodities and exchange their services for these essentials.
Thus, transportation became a necessity for commerce and
urbanization. At this stage in history, transportation was
used as a means to transport essentials and to obtain speci-
lized services.
With the advent of the industrial revolution, cottage
industries began to decline because mass production and new
power sources required a greater capital outlay than one
individual could afford. This resulted in the separation of
worker from his place of work and eventually the separation
of the factory from the distribution center. These factors
created the commuter and the need to transport manufactured
goods to the market place. The result was transportation's
role today - transportation is used to transport essentials
to the market, to carry the worker to the factory, to carry
the manufactured goods to the market, and to carry the farmer
and urbanite to the market.
As new modes of transportation developed, the time-distance
relationship decreased. This allowed factories to consolidate
in order to take advantage of increased economics of scale
since the cost of shipping raw materials over greater dis-
tances was less. Transportation also increased the market
area for goods. As industry concentrated in urban areas, so
did the workers; thus, cities began to grow in size because
of the aggregation of factories and, thereby, workers. Be-
cause new transportation modes reduced the time-distance re-
lationship, workers could live farther from their place of
work as they could commute greater distances in the same
amount of time. This resulted in the phenomenon of decen-
tralization which was also encouraged by the attempt of the
urbanite to escape disadvantages of living in the central
city.
The advent of the motor vehicle further increased the
mobility of man and reduced the time-distance relationship.
This further accelerated the rate of decentralization of
urban areas, with a rising level of family income also came
increasing motor vehicle ownership. These phenomena have
resulted in increased congestion on existing highways in
urban areas.
Early Governmental Involvement In Transportation
In the early years of the United States, the Federal
government dabbled in isolated highway construction projects
to open the interior of the nation for settlement and to ex-
pand the national economy. The most notable project was the
Cumberland Road which had been invisioned by President
Jefferson as early as 1806. Congress appropriated money to
build this road in 1829, and it was completed to Indianapolis
in 1838. Today the Cumberland Road is better known as the
National Road or U.S. 40. Until the advent of the Inter-
state system, it was one of the most heavily traveled roads
in Indiana. The Federal government also subsidized the
railroads, particularly after the Civil War, in order to open
the west, link the Nation, and expand the economy.
When Indiana became a State in 1816, five percent of the
funds derived from public land sales within the State were
set aside for the construction of public roads and canals.
Sixty percent of these funds were retained for use within
the State under the direction of the State legislature; the
remaining forty percent was retained by Congress to build
roads to the State. The Federal percentage, along with funds
from Ohio and Illinois, vsrere used to finance the Cumberland Road,
Indiana's three percent went primarily to open up means
of communication between communities and to link those com-
munities in the sourthern part of the State to Indianapolis,
the capital. No administrative agency was given the authority
to layout, build and maintain the State roads, and the Indiana
legislature authorized the construction of each road by a sep-
arate legislative act. The maintenance that was performed
on the State roads was done by district supervisors with the
aid of labor from each community.
Prior to 1850, major roads built during the era of
"Internal Improvement" in Indiana included the Old Vincennes
Road (Vincennes and New Albany Turnpike) from New Albany
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through Greenville, Fredericksburg, Paoli, Mt. Pleasant and
Washington to the Wabash River at Vincennes presently U.S.
150; the Lafayette- Jeffersonville Turnpike from New Albany
through Salem, Bono, Bedford, Bloomington, Greencastle and
Crawfordsville to the Wabash River at Lafayette - approxi-
mated today by SR 60 from New Albany to Mitchell, SR 37 to
Bloomington, SR 46 to Spencer and U.S. 231 to Lafayette; the
Michigan Road from Madison through Greensburg, Shellyville,
Indianapolis, Logansport and South Bend to Michigan City
(secured through special treaty with the Potawatomi Indians
and an Act of Congress) - approximated by U.S. 421 from
Madison to east of Frankfort, SR 29 to Logansport, SR 25 to
Rochester, U.S. 31 to South Bend and U.S. 20 to Michigan City;
and the National Road from Richmond through Cambridge City,
Indianapolis and Greencastle to Terre Haute - approximated
by present U.S. 40. [Refer to Figure 1, p. 11]. During
this era, private companies were authorized to build turnpikes
and plank roads and to charge tolls for their use.
Because of the heavy debt incurred in the internal im-
provement program, and particularly the failure of the bond
issues on the Indiana canal system, the Indiana State govern-
ment went into bankruptcy in the late 1830* s. As a direct
result, the new Indiana constitution prevented any deficit
financing by the State government.
Because the State road system became too complex to ad-
minister through individual road acts and appeared to be only
of local significance with the coming of the railroad era,
the State roads were turned over to private companies and
counties for maintenance. All new road construction was done
by these companies and financed through tolls.
Initially, rural highways were maintained by the abutting
property owner. As an individual's time became limited, he
began to pay the local government to perform the task rather
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build free gravel roads. Counties were authorized to issue
bonds (to be retired by assessments on the benefiting properties)
to build these free roads and to purchase private toll roads
for free county roads. The responsibility of maintaining
these free roads was turned over to the counties in 1879.
In summary, the Federal and State governments played a
limited role in highway transportation development in the
Nineteenth Century. No continuous highway construction pro-
gram existed during this era, and no administrative agency
was given sole responsibility for laying out, building and
maintaining a State or National road system.
Governmental Involvement in Highway Transportation
on a Continuous Basis
The Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 signaled the entrance
of the Federal government into highway construction with the
financing of intercity highways. To obtain these Federal
funds, the States were required to provide matching funds.
The Federal government supervised projects utilizing
Federal highway funds and exercised some measure of control
in laying out, designing and constructing these roads. The
States were responsible for the maintenance of such roads
and had to have a highway department for the receipt and ex-
penditure of the Federal aid funds.
Probably motivated by the Federal Act , the Indiana Gen-
eral Assembly created the Indiana State Highway Commission
on March 7, 1917. The 1917 Act, however, was declared un-
constitutional by a decision of the Court in Hamilton County.
As a result, the Commission suspended meetings until the con-
stitutionality of the law had been decided by the Indiana
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court
decision. However, in 1919 the Indiana General Assembly re-
pealed the 1917 act and created a new Indiana State Highway
Commission.
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The 1919 Act required the Commission to lay out a system
of State highways connecting every county seat, town over
5000 population, and the trunk highways of adjoining States
by April 20, 1920. The original Indiana State Highway System
consisted of 3,221 miles of State highways, about five per-
cent of the entire road system in Indiana. The present
11,714 mile State Highway system covers about 11.2% of the
entire highway system in Indiana and carries more than fifty
percent of the vehicle-miles.
Due to the unrelated and unintegrated improvement of
State highways with Federal funds and the resulting failure
to form a consistent network of intercity links, the Federal
Highway Act of 1921 required the States to select seven per-
cent of the total rural mileage to be designated as the Federal
Aid System. This would hopefully insure a connected system
of highways of interstate character receiving Federal funds.
The Federal Highway Act of 1921 also provided Federal
aid to extensions of the Federal aid system through communities
of less than 2500 population. The Emergency Relief and Con-
struction Act of 1932 allowed Federal monies to be used for
urban stretches of Federal aid highways. The Hayden-Cartwright
Act of 1934 extended Federal aid to highway construction within
municipalities as emergency relief. In 1936, grants in aid
were allowed on urban extensions of the Federal aid systems
for elimination of hazards at railroad grade crossings.
The Need Arises
In the late 1930' s, the conventional primary system,
which moved traffic and provided access to abutting land uses,
could no longer move traffic efficiently and safely between
major cities. The need for a transcontinental network of
superhighways designed to move traffic rapidly and safely
became clear. Research and experience by this time had also
emphasized that such efficient movement was not possible if
roads were also required to serve adjacent property.
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In 1938, Congress requested that the Director of the
Bureau of Public Roads conduct a study of the feasibility of
a toll financed system of three east-west and three north-
south superhighways. The resulting study, Toll Roads and
Free Roads of 1939, determined that the suggested toll road
system would not be self-supporting. However, the 1939 re-
port documented the need for an interregional superhighway
system connecting the major metropolitan areas. The formal
origin of the Interstate Highway System is generally traced
to this report to Congress in 1939.
Subsequent studies further substantiated the need for
an interregional highway system and set forth goals for such
a system. These needs studies and proposed highway programs
are the subject of discussion in the next chapter of this
report.
Goals
From needs studies, various proposed highway programs
and legislation came most of the goals for the Interstate
System. The overall goal of the highway network was to pro-
vide for the rapid, safe and efficient movement of goods and
people. Inadequate highways endangered the health, national
security and safety of the citizen; impeded the free flow of
traffic; contributed to accidents and congestion; increased
motor vehicle operation costs; depreciated property values;
and obstructed the normal social and economic progress of
the Nation. Since the Interstate System carried one-fifth
of the total vehicle miles and linked all regions of the
Nation, it was the most important highway network. Subse-
quently, improvement of the Interstate System was essential
in meeting overall National goals.
Although overall goals appeared in almost all needs
studies and proposed highway programs, certain goals were
predominant and provided the impetus to a needs study or
proposed program at a particular time. Immediately prior
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to United States' entrance into World War II, the emphasis
of the studies was on military preparedness. The initial
interstate study, Toll Roads and Free Roads , and the 1941
needs study, Highways for the National Defense , justified
the improvement of an interstate system primarily on the
basis of National defense and secondarily on the basis of
economic growth. The National Interregional Highway Committee
supported the improvement of the Interstate System as a means
of stabilizing the national economy and particularly as a
means of preventing an economic slump after World War II.
The Committee placed nearly equal emphasis on improvement
of the System for the goals of future economic growth and
national defense. The 1949 needs study, Highway Needs of
the National Defense , stressed improvement of the Interstate
System on the basis of the System's strategic importance;
however, improvement of the System on the basis of its im-
portance to the economy and the highway user was also
emphasized. The 1954 needs study and the document a 10-year
National Highway Program supported improvement of the Inter-
state System primarily on the basis of the need of an ade-
quate highway network for sustained economic growth. The
Interstate Program, however, was cited as an essential
defense need when it was funded in 1956.
The various program development studies over the years
specified that the interstate system was to link all regions
of the Nation. This was the primary working goal for the
interstate system - the primary task the Interstate System
was to accomplish. The program development studies further
specified that route selection was to be based on connecting
the major population areas and serving the heaviest travel
desires. The 1944 interregional highway study set forth an
extensive list of specific goals for the interstate system.
These included connecting major population, industrial and
agricultural concentrations; linking areas of high motor
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vehicle ownership concentrations; conforming with the strategy
highway network; linking major military and naval establish-
ments and war industry; serving the heaviest traffic demands;
and insuring a consistent and integrated system of highways.
Federal legislation codified the specific goals for the
interstate system into law. Section 7 of the Post-War Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1944 stated:
"There shall be designated within the conti-
nental United States a National System of
Interstate highways not exceeding 40,000
miles in total extent so located as to connect
by routes, as direct as practicable, the
principal metropolitan areas, cities and
industrial centers, to serve the national
defense, and to connect at suitable border
points with routes of continental importance
in the Dominion of Canada and the Republic
of Mexico"!*
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 reiterated these goals
and added a new goal. The 1956 Act still called for the
funding of an improved transportation system to meet the
needs of a growing economy and to improve the national and
civil defense, but added to meet increasing local needs for
transportation where feasible.
As the urban transportation problem began to grow, the
last objective (that of serving local needs) received greater
emphasis. Although the primary role of the Interstate System
was the connection of major metropolitan areas, the Interstate
System sections in urban areas were increasingly viewed as
a means of alleviating urban transportation problems. The
interpretation of this objective was to pose problems
throughout the Program.
Superscript numbers refer to Notes at the end of the chapter,
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Notes
Laws Relating to Federal Aid in Construction of Roads
(Washington, D. C: U.S. Government Printing Office,




Once the goals and objectives had been established, the
next step was to investigate the various concepts to
accomplish the goals. The alternative concepts to be con-
sidered included maintenance of the existing level of
service on the existing highway systems; improving the
level of service (upgrading) on the existing highway system;
improving the level of service, primarily by expanding the
existing highway systems; creating a new highway system but
by upgrading and incorporating segments of existing highway
systems; creating an entirely new highway system; or
combinations of these alternatives. Over a period of
seventeen years (1939-1956) , numerous studies attempted to
determine the present and future deficiencies of the
existing highway systems, to formulate a concept to correct
these deficiencies and, thereby, to attain the goals set
forth. These studies also considered the means necessary
to accomplish the established goals utilizing the concepts
selected. The means generally involved statements or
policies on the utilization of resources (material, human,
and financial) , the scheduling of revenues and construction
expenditures, and the general design standards to which
improvements were to be built.
The needs studies and proposed highway program studies
were closely interrelated since the needs served as a basis
for a proposed improvement program. However, the needs
studies concentrated on the determination of present and
possible future highway deficiencies and on the cost to
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overcome these deficiencies, and left the formulation of
means to correct the deficiencies to the improvement
programs. On the other hand, the improvement programs
concentrated on the formulation of the means to overcome
the deficiencies and incorporated the findings of needs
studies.
The elements of these studies that were incorporated
in the accepted Interstate Program will be reiterated and
elaborated in the next chapter.
Toll Roads and Free Roads
The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1938 first enunciated
the concept of a national system comprised of key high
volume highways. Section 13 of this Act states:
"The Chief of the Bureau of Public Roads
is hereby directed to investigate and make a
report of his findings and recommend to the
Congress not later than February 1, 1939, with
respect to the feasibility of building, and
cost of, superhighways not exceeding three in
number, running in a general direction from
the eastern to the western portion of the
United States, and not exceeding three in
number, running in a general direction from
the northern to the southern portion of the
United States, including the feasibility of
a toll system on such roads. "1
In April of 1939, the Bureau of Public Roads presented
the toll road feasibility report Toll Roads and Free Roads
to Congress. The report concluded that financing of the
full costs of the six superhighways by direct tolls was not
feasible. However, the report documented the need for a
system of interregional highways and demonstrated the
important relationship of such a system to the national
defense. This concern was codified by the report in "The
Master Plan for Free Highway Development"; the details of
which were to be worked out in later studies.
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The six toll roads of 14,336 miles were estimated to
cost $2,899,800,000, were to be constructed over a fifteen
year period from 1945 to 1960, and were to be financed by a
30-year loan at 2.6$ interest and 2.24$ interest for retire-
2
ment. The toll road committee laid out the tentative
routes and estimated the respective construction costs.
[Refer to Figure 2, page 21]. After an evaluation of the
traffic volumes and the forecasted tolls, the committee
found that direct tolling would only pay for one-third of
the construction cost for the entire toll system.
As a note of interest, the portion of the proposed
toll road system in Indiana, which coincides with the
present East-West Indiana Toll Road, was estimated to be
one of the ten most heavily traveled sections of the
proposed toll road system. Although the cost of constructing
the Indiana section of the toll road system was estimated at
$30,301,460, this section of the system could be feasibly
financed by toll collection, except for a small portion in
far eastern Indiana.
Two desirable characteristics of toll roads - long
distances between access points and alternative free
routes - made the interregional toll road system infeasible.
However, rebuilding and improvement of the main rural high-
ways was but one element in a larger program, called "The
Master Plan for Free Highway Development", which sought to
modernize and extend public streets and highway facilities.
The master highway plan called for the modernization of the
Federal-Aid System; the elimination of hazardous railroad
grade crossings; the improvement of secondary and feeder
roads, properly integrated with land use programs; the
establishment of a Federal Land Authority to acquire,
hold, sell and lease lands needed for public purposes and to
acquire and sell excess lands for the purpose of recoupment;
and the construction of an interregional highway system to serve










































































increasing volumes in urban areas, the master highway plan
recognized an increasing need in urban areas for new high-
ways, such as belt lines and bypasses, and for new means of
financing. To overcome highway deficiencies in rural areas,
a 26,700-mile interregional highway system was designated
on the basis of traffic volumes, population concentrations,
and the suggestions of the War Department. [Refer to Figure
3, page 22]. It was also recommended that the federal
government bear more than fifty percent of the cost of
constructing the interregional highway system. Final
location of the interregional system was to be determined
by further study under the direction of the Bureau of Public
Roads in cooperation with the War Department and State
highway departments.
Despite the financial infeasibility of an interregional
toll road system, H. A. Wallace (the Secretary of
Agriculture) stated: "Primary importance (was) attached to
the designation and progressive improvement of a system of
direct interregional highways designed to facilitate the
long and expeditious movements that may be necessary in the
national defense, and similarly wide-ranging travel of
motorists in their own vehicles - a travel which, in addition
to its immediate recreational benefits, is a powerful force
for national unity."
6 Thus, the Interstate System had its
birth for the primary reason of defense, which is under-
standable considering the times.
The Future of Indiana Roads
In 1940, the Chairman of the Indiana State Highway
Commission reviewed the present status of Indiana and
captured the feeling of the times toward future highways in
an address to the 26th Annual Road School at Purdue
University.
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The Nation had begun to realize the importance of roads
in social and economic life. Because of war conditions,
there was recognition of the importance of roads in national
defense. There was also a feeling that governments could
no longer afford to invest the highway dollar in highways
that go nowhere or cost more to maintain than they can earn
through the traffic served, and that more funds would be
spent on maintenance and reconstruction than new roads.
In 1938, Indiana was ninth in motor vehicle registra-
tions, yet thirty-sixth in the user tax per vehicle.
Ninety-five percent of the county bridges and sixty percent
of the State system bridges had widths of less than twenty
feet. Fifty-seven percent of the county and seventeen
percent of the State system bridges had a loading capacity
of less than five tons. Twenty percent of the State system
and seventy-one percent of the county system had rights-of-
way of less than sixty feet.
Although Congress had proposed a national system of
superhighways financed by tolls, few sections of Indiana's
highways could be feasibly financed by tolls at that time.
Nevertheless, Indiana had begun to build four-lane divided
highways and to overcome deficiencies in bridges and rights-
of-way. The need for controlled-access highways, however,
was still sometime in the future.
Highway Needs for National Defense
In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt requested the
Public Roads Administration to make a survey of the adequacy
of highways for National defense. On February 1, 1941, the
report entitled Highways for the National Defense suggested
improvements for the 74,600-mile strategic highway network
which connected defense industry centers and military
concentration points. The strategic highway network
coincided with a strategic highway map developed by General
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Pershing plus a few additions. The routes of greatest
importance on the strategic network coincided with those
chosen by the Bureau of Public Roads in Toll Roads and Free
Roads for inclusion in the system of interregional highways,
which was an alternative to the proposed national toll road
system.
The major improvements recommended for the strategic
highway network and, to a degree for the smaller inter-
regional highway system, included the strengthening of
bridges of less than 15,000 pound shear design, the
widening of 5,090 miles of highway of less than eighteen
-
foot width, and the resurfacing of 14,000 miles of roads
incapable of supporting 10,000-pound axle loads. The Public
Roads Administration estimated that $485 million would be
needed to correct these deficiencies and suggested that a
minimum of $100 million be made available immediately to
the States at somewhat higher than an eciual matching basis and
that $12 million be made available for plans and surveys to
upgrade the strategic network.
Planning the Interregional Highway System
Further studies were made in establishing the location
of the interregional highway system as recommended in Toll
Roads and Free Roads . Federal and state agencies coopera-
tively selected 29,330 miles (25,554 rural miles and 3,776
urban miles) of existing highway that approximated the routes
of the proposed interregional highway system. [Refer to
Figure 4, p. 26 ]. The basis for selecting this mileage was
service to population centers and inclusion of the most
heavily traveled routes (eleven percent of the total rural
vehicle-miles in 1937 were included in the routes selected
for the system.) with deviation from direct routes between
major population concentrations to serve the largest inter-
































urban facilities that would provide free flow of traffic
through the centers of major cities; however, to assure the
free flow of intercity traffic, limited-access belt lines
might be required in the larger cities. The interregional
highway system was to bypass all small communities. The
completed interregional system was to consist of one percent
of the total rural mileage, yet would carry 12.5 percent of
the total rural vehicle-miles.
Because of the belief that rural highways beyond the
immediate vicinity of cities were of sufficient capacity to
carry existing traffic, rural highways were to be upgraded
to interregional system standards only when each section
g
could no longer provide adequate service. The regional
distribution of the interregional routes was compared with
various indices (population, area, national wealth, national
income, cash value of farm income, value of manufactured
sales, and value of mineral production) to evaluate the
location of the system and justify its construction. Based
on 1937 motor vehicle taxes (0.582<fr per vehicle-mile) and
a 173$ growth in traffic on the system over the next 30
years, the ratio of earnings to cost varied from 1.59 for
sections with volumes under 3000 vehicles per day to 1.73
for sections with volumes between 3000 and 9999 vehicles per
day to 2.00 for sections with volumes over 10000 vehicles
g
per day over a thirty year amortization period. Hence, the
interregional highway system, which was estimated to
initially cost $3,911,572,000, was a financially feasible
undertaking over a thirty year period.
Interregional Highways
On April 14 of 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
appointed the National Interregional Highway Committee to
investigate the need for a limited system of national high-
ways to improve the present interstate transportation
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facilities, to determine the desirable level of improvement
for such a system and to investigate the possibility of
utilizing, the excess manpower and industrial capacity
anticipated to be available after the war to carry out such
improvements. In 1943, Congress, via section five of the
Federal Highway Act of 1943, further directed the Public
Roads Administration to make a survey of the need for a
system of expressways, the number needed, the cost of con-
structing such a system, and the necessary legislation.
A single report entitled Interregional Highways was
developed by the National Interregional Highway Committee
in cooperation with the Public Roads Administration and was
presented to Congress in 1944. The report documented the
need for an interregional system of highways and recommended
the designation of a 39,000-mile interregional system of
urban and rural highways which connected the principal
geographic regions of the Nation and generally followed the
routes of existing Federal aid highways. Although the
proposed system included approximately one percent of the
total road mileage in the Nation, it was expected to carry
one-fifth of the total vehicle-miles. Development of the
system was deemed essential to the future economic growth
and defense of the Nation by the Committee. The study also
recommended improvement of the system to high geometric
design standards including limited-access control. No over-
all cost estimate was made for the system, but the estimated
expenditure rate to construct the system was $750 million
per year with two-thirds going to urban and one-third to
rural segments of the system.
In his message to Congress accompanying the final
report, the President was particularly concerned with the
problem of right-of-way acquisition for the system. Although
it is generally cheaper to build a new route than to widen
an existing route and despite the fact that acquisition
cost usually increases with time, he felt that final routes
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should not be definitely fixed in the planning stages.
President Roosevelt pressed for the implementation of the
interregional highway program because it would utilize
excess productively during the post war period and avert a
recession that usually follows a war. He also stressed the
need to modernize the transportation system to meet
increasing transportation demands and the importance of such
an improvement to the Nation's long range economy.
Background for Study
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1916, the first modern
legislation for Federal support of highways, did not require
highway classification; consequently, highway construction
resulted in isolated or disconnected sections of highway.
The principle of classification by function and preferential
treatment was emphasized by the Federal Highway Act of 1921;
under this legislation, the states were allowed to designate
seven percent of their rural mileage as eligible for Federal
funds. This designation insured coordinated improvement of
interconnected segments of a system as opposed to improve-
ment of isolated and unrelated sections of highway.
For many years since initial Federal involvement in
highway financing, the policy of staged construction had
been universally accepted. However, the upgrading of high-
ways on existing alignments created problems on the inter-
regional system. Increases in motor vehicle registration,
traffic volume, and speed had not been fully anticipated;
even if they had been foreseen, a lack of necessary legal
sanctions prevented advanced acquisition of rights-of-way
for wider and divided highways. Many highways of regional
importance had become obsolete in design, lacking the
capacity and alignment to carry traffic at high volumes and
high speeds.
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The primary reasons for immediate designation of the
interregional system were as follows: (1) the most important
highways had suffered because of obsolete locations, align-
ments, and right-of-way widths; (2) although these roads
still had physical life remaining, they were functionally
obsolete in design and capacity; (3) these roads had long
since repaid their cost in benefits; and (4) for the main
highways of the Nation to be improved uniformly, they had to
be designated for special treatment. Other reasons for
designating the system included the past neglect of urban
highway deficiencies and the discovery that highway defi-
ciencies were more severe in urban areas than rural areas.
This implied that transcity connections were now important.
The optimum system to be selected was to hold national needs
as paramount, to connect metropolitan areas and intermediate
cities such that the system encompassed the origins and
destinations of most traffic flow, and to include high volume
routes which would assure utilization of the system. Several
system lengths had been proposed in the past. The report
Toll Roads and Free Roads had suggested 14,336 miles for a
national toll road system and 26,700 miles for the inter-
regional system; the Public Roads Administration increased
the interregional system to 29,330 miles, so that it in-
corporated the principal highways of the strategic highway
network of 1941. However, the National Interregional High-
way Committee elected to evaluate various lengths to
determine the optimum system length.
The objective of selection was "to incorporate, within
each of the several mileage limits adopted, those principal
highway routes which could reach to all sections of the
country, form within themselves a complete network, and
jointly attract and adequately serve a greater traffic
volume than any other system of equal extent and condition."
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The Recommended Interregional Highway System
The system, which had the highest average daily traffic
volume for the number of miles included, proved to be one of the
shorter system alternatives [Refer to Figure 5, p. 32 ].
The recommended system included 29,450 miles of rural high-
way (0.99 percent of the 2,964,677 miles of rural road) and
4,470 miles of urban highway (1.48 percent of the 303,040
miles of urban road) for a total of 33,920 miles (1.04 per-
cent of the 3,267,717 miles of road in the United States).
The interregional system included 950 miles (790 rural miles
12and 160 urban miles) in Indiana. This amounted to 1.1
percent of the total highway mileage in the state, 1.03
percent of the Indiana rural mileage and 1.61 percent of the
Indiana urban mileage.
The recommended system connected all cities of 300,000
or more in population, 59 of 62 cities in the 100,000 to
300,000 population range, and 87 of 107 cities in the
50,000 to 100,000 population range. A 48,300-mile system
reached 91 of 107 cities in the 50,000 to 100,000 population
range. If the system were increased to 78,800 miles, only
four additional cities would have been served in the 50,000
to 100,000 population range. Only in connecting cities
under 50,000 population did these two longer systems prove
superior to the recommended 33,920 mile system. However, in
reaching an increasing number of smaller cities, the longer
systems suffered a loss in the average daily traffic volume
served by the system as a whole. The recommended system
failed to connect Akron, Canton and Youngstown in the
100,000 to 300,000 population range; however, the system
passed in close proximity to these cities and linked all
but ten of the 140 metropolitan districts (urban areas of
50,000 or more population) as defined by the 1940 Census.
Although the recommended system connected only 54.5









































aggregate population of these cities amounted to 82.6 per-
cent of the total urban population of the United States.
To connect all cities of 10,000 or more in population would
have required a system three times as long as the recommended
system. The recommended system passed through 34.3 percent
of the Nation's counties, yet served 45.2 percent of the
rural population.
Truck traffic volume is generally greatest on highways
serving industrial centers. The industrial cities connected
to the preferred system accounted for 83 percent of the
total value added by manufacturing.
The system passed through counties which accounted for
43.3 percent of the total farm value added. These counties
averaged 46 percent higher in value added than those counties
not included.
By county, the system served 68.7 percent of the
registered vehicles in 1941; 696,773 of 1,053,063 vehicles
registered in the State of Indiana in 1941 were in counties
traversed by the interregional highway system.
There was a belief that surplus labor after the war
could be utilized in the construction of the interregional
system. This policy would hopefully prevent an economic
recession after the war. The location of the system fell
near major industrial concentrations where labor was
expected to be released from war production.
The strategic highway network of the military included
almost all the interregional system that had been proposed.
Thus, the interregional system linked most of the military
and naval installations and war industry concentrations.
[Refer to Figure 6, p. 34 ].
Some of the most heavily traveled sections of highway
were not included in the system because the traffic was
local in nature; however, the most heavily traveled routes
in a region were included in the interregional system.

































order to hold down mileage on the system and to serve
regional traffic in preference to local traffic. The average
vehicle volume per day on the rural portion of the system
was estimated to be 2,660; thus, the system would carry
16.79 percent of the rural vehicle-miles daily, based on
1940 data. If generated traffic were considered, the system
would eventually carry one-fifth of the rural vehicle-miles
even though the system would comprise only one percent of
the total rural mileage in the United States.
Although the system followed land formation and
principal rivers, topographic features were of secondary
importance in locating the system. This was probably due
to the fact that population had concentrated along the
oldest transportation corridors, the rivers.
Selection of Routes for the Interregional System
"In selecting the routes to comprise the system and in
determining the extent of the system to be recommended, the
primary purpose was to select routes forming an integrated
system of reasonably limited total extent which would join
the principal centers of population and industry in each
geographic region with centers of similar relative
importance in other geographic regions, by lines as direct
as practicable." The principal determinants in the
selection of mileage for inclusion in the system were,
therefore, interconnection of larger cities in all regions,
accommodation of trips to smaller cities so far as
practicable, and designation of a system of optimum length
and maximum utilization.
The importance of interconnecting major cities was
exhibited by the fact that eighty-six percent of all
traffic on intercity highways had at least one trip end in
an urban area, and that the most heavily traveled segments
of the interregional system were within the influence zone
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of urban areas. From past studies it had been found that
the longer the trip the greater the proportion of trips
having a trip end in an urban area, that traffic increased
as the urban area was approached, and that transcity
connections of the interregional system would be subject to
traffic peaks.
Because travel on major highways was composed of both
short and long trip lengths (eighty-five percent of all
trips being less than twenty miles long) , it was not practical
from the standpoint of user service to utilize the most
direct alignments between major urban areas. The routes
were diverted from direct lines to serve smaller urban areas
based on population and industrial importance.
To determine the optimum length of the system, several
alternative lengths were compared to determine which would
be utilized to the greatest extent. Route lengths of
14,300 and 26,700 miles described in Toll Roads and Free
Roads ; 29,300 miles, described in the June, 1941, issue of
the Public Roads Magazine ; 48,300 miles; and 78,800 miles
were considered. The difference in lengths of the
alternatives was due to the progressive addition of more
routes to serve a greater area.
The smallest system omitted some of the cities of
300,000 to 500,000 in population and one city over 500,000
in population. The largest system connected a larger per-
centage of the urban areas of 10,000 or more in population.
The five alternatives were plotted, and a system of
29,300 miles was found to have the greatest average daily
traffic volume. "If this value could be exceeded, it was
conjectured that a maximum value might be obtained by a
properly selected system of either 36,000 or 33,000 miles
approximately, the mileages represented by other inter-
sections of the straight lines of the graph." [Refer to
Table 1 and Figure 7, p. 37 ]• The 36,000-mile system was
developed by adding routes to the 29,300-mile system to
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TABLE I. ESTIMATED URBAN, RURAL, AND TOTAL
MILEAGE, TOTAL RURAL VEHICLE MILEAGE,
AND AVERAGE DAILY TRAFFIC ON RURAL
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reach important cities not reached by the smaller system and
by eliminating a few of the less important routes. [Refer
to Figure 8, p. 39 ] • However, since a lower average rural
daily traffic volume resulted for the 36,000-mile system
than the 29,300-mile system, routes were eliminated to form
a 33,920-mile system which had an average rural daily traffic
volume of greater magnitude than the smaller 29,300-mile
system or the larger 36,000-mile system. This final system
incorporated 0.99 percent of the Nation's total rural mileage
and in 1941 served 16.7 percent of the total rural vehicle
mileage
.
The Interregional Highway Study concluded that the
optimum system must connect as many large cities as possible
to attract a large proportion of the total traffic, provide
adequate routes to larger urban areas and most urban areas
of 10,000 or more in population, and have a direct routing
between the larger cities in the more densely populated
sections of the Nation. Direct routing should not be
sacrificed for a close approach to cities of less than
10,000 population (which might better be served by connecting
routes from the system). The optimum mileage of 33,920
miles for the interregional system was measured along
existing routes and based on the 1941 capacity of these
routes. A total of 2,123 miles of the recommended system
provided direct connections into and through urban areas of
10,000 or more in population. An additional 2,347 miles of
the system passed through cities of less than 10,000 in
population; these cities could probably be bypassed,
resulting in a reduction of the overall system length.
Since the recommended system did not include alternate
circumferential or distribution routes, which would be re-
quired in larger cities for bypassing through traffic or for
distributing and collecting local traffic, the national
Interregional Highway Committee estimated that these











I— |_ r-Dw 2h Dho£ 03 OZ>

























optimum 33,920-mile system. Hence, the recommended
Interregional System would be approximately 39,000 miles in
length.
Route Selection in Urban Areas
The Interregional study presented principles for the
location of interregional routes in urban areas. These
principles will be briefly summarized in this section and
will be covered in greater detail in Chapter V.
The dominant principle was that the interregional
routes should conform to the future shape of cities as well
as to the existing urban pattern and their related urban
travel patterns. Cooperation between State highway depart-
ments and local planning and highway agencies was stressed
in the process of selecting routes in and about urban areas.
Although bypasses provide considerable benefits to through
traffic, a large portion of traffic has a trip end in urban
areas; therefore, the advantages to bypassing for through
traffic must be weighed against service to traffic with a
trip end in the urban area. Because the interiors of urban
wedges formed by traditional transportation routes were
found to be less developed, the study suggested the location
of urban segments of the Interregional System through the
interior of these wedges to stimulate development and to
assure a less costly right-of-way location. Circumferential
routes were suggested for larger urban areas to serve intra-
urban traffic with trip ends in the development wedges, to
serve interurban traffic with an adequate collection and
distribution system, and to serve through traffic with a
bypass facility. Major traffic generators and mode inter-
faces based on future traffic patterns were to be considered
in the route location process. The location and number of
intersections and grade separations were also considered to
be important in locating the route. Compatibility with
changes in the existing urban pattern and with the urban
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transportation plan was considered essential; the route
location plan was to be conceived in relation to a desirable
future urban development pattern.
Access Limitation
Because the Interregional System was to serve through
traffic, the system was to have preference over all inter-
secting routes. To insure this objective, the study
recommended that all routes of the system be legally
designated as limited-access highways. "This designation
will impower administrative authorities, wherever and when-
ever necessary for the convenience of express traffic and
the promotion of safety, to deny access to the interregional
highways from abutting lands or control or limit such
access as may be found desirable, and similarly to deny or
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limit access, as desirable, from other public roads."
In sparsely settled areas, all properties might have
access on lightly traveled rural interregional routes
provided the point of access was controlled to maintain the
integrity of the express route and to insure safety. Minor
rural roads were to be closed and their traffic diverted to
other roads which were retained across the interregional
highway. At-grade intersections were considered acceptable
on light to moderately heavy volume sections of the inter-
regional system in rural areas. Deceleration and acceler-
ation lanes, refuge islands and channels were required for
at-grade intersections. For heavily traveled routes,
complete grade separation and complete prohibition of access
to abutting land was required. Service roads were to be
built for those denied access to the system, but who
previously had access to the route.
When local routes to the center of the city were
adequate, access to the interregional facility by local
traffic was to be denied. The Interregional System was to
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serve primarily interregional (interurban, through or long
distance) traffic and secondarily local traffic.
In 1944, public law gave the owner the right of access
to all public roads; however, laws to restructure this
access right were needed in most states if the intent of
the interregional system were to remain.
Acquisition of Rights-of -Way
The National Interregional Highway Committee strongly
recommended the creation of a revolving fund for advance
right-of-way acquisition. This would expedite the purchase
of land for future public construction prior to development
in these areas. This would forestall increased condemnation
costs and higher costs in time and money for acquisition of
the land. Many existing State land acquisition laws also
needed revision to speed up acquisition procedures.
When extensive realignment was needed for the improve-
ment of a highway, it had generally been found cheaper to
acquire entirely new right-of-way and to relocate the route.
A block wide acquisition concept was considered
desirable in urban areas to insure service roads for
property which faced the facility, to maintain existing
utilities, and to provide adequate right-of-way width for
the interregional facility.
Excess acquisition for future widening was sanctioned
by law in a few states; however, laws were needed in most
states to acquire adjacent land for future widening, to
protect the integrity of interregional highways from in-
compatible land uses, and to dispose of land no longer
needed. The use of police power to control roadside land
use was suggested as a possible alternative to outright
acquisition of abutting land.
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Design of the Interregional System
The Interregional Study recommended landscaping policies
that included preservation of the roadside environment,
utilization of screening to conceal objectionable roadside
conditions and to conceal the highway from residential
development, and location to fit topographic contours. Trees
were to be preserved where possible, and "the recreation of
a natural foreground environment in harmony with the distant
view" was emphasized as opposed to regularly spaced plantings
20
which are monotonous and distracting. In the acquisition
of right-of-way, consideration was to be given to the width
necessary to prevent encroachment and to protect and enhance
the view from the highway. The objectionable uses to be
screened also included signboards. Great emphasis was
placed on the use of landscaping and the reduction of slopes
to improve drainage and reduce erosion. Variable width
medians and separate alignments were suggested for divided
highways when terrain and cost warranted such treatment.
The Interregional Study design recommendations included
an adequate design for vehicle volumes twenty years after
the date of initial construction, for vehicle weights of
18,000 pounds per axle, and for dimensions anticipated twenty
years hence. For rural sections, the recommended design
speed was 75 mph for auto and not less than 60 mph for trucks
in flat terrain, and not less than 55 mph for autos and 35
mph for trucks in difficult terrain; sufficient design
capacity was suggested so that the running speed did not fall
below 50 mph, except during infrequent peaks. For urban
sections (defined as a length of highway at least one mile
long with intersecting roads a maximum of one-quarter mile
apart) , the design speed was to be not less than 50 mph for
autos and 35 mph for trucks with sufficient design capacity
so that the running speed did not fall below 40 mph, except
during infrequent peaks. Other requirements were adequate
shoulders for disabled vehicles, and all road surfaces,
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pavements and structures capable of supporting recommended
weights. The report suggested that facilities should be
elevated only when no other alternative was feasible.
Depressed facilities may require more right-of-way, may
necessitate more utility relocation, and may cause more
drainage problems; nevertheless, they were considered more
pleasing aesthetically and a better interface with the
urban environment.
Constructing the Interregional System
An inventory of the physical conditions of existing
highways, which closely conformed to the anticipated align-
ment of the Interregional System, revealed that few rural roads
and almost no urban streets were adequate by Interregional
design standards. Less than one percent of the rural
bridges were adequate for twenty-ton shear and sixteen-ton
moment loadings and had a vertical clearance of fourteen
feet. A slight majority of the highways had high type
pavement; however, most highways were insufficient in width
(twenty-four feet for 1000 to 3000 vehicles per day and
four twelve -foot lanes for 3000 to 10000 vehicles per day)
and alignment.
The principle of minimum rate and indispensable order
of construction was utilized to determine the desirable
order and rate of construction. This principle states that
"Obsolescence of the existing roads will thus determine a
minimum rate at which the interregional system should be
constructed, and it may be stated as a general principle,
that - Whenever an existing highway conforming approximately
to a route of the interregional highway system shall require
reconstruction, by reason of the deterioration of its surface
or other incapacity, the highway should be reconstructed only
in the location and to the standard of design necessary to
make it an acceptable link in the designated interregional
highway system." 21 At this minimum rate of reconstruction,
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it would require nearly twenty years to upgrade the system;
and many of the lighter pavements reconstructed to inter-
regional standards would require reconstruction before the
entire system had been upgraded. If construction of the
system were to utilize the manpower and industrial capacity
released after the war, as the President suggested, the
rate of reconstruction would have to undoubtedly exceed the
minimum. It was also considered desirable to exceed the
minimum rate of reconstruction to realize earlier the
benefits of safe and unobstructed traffic flow. The study
found that the longer the construction was delayed, the
greater the amount of construction required for a specific
time period. This was due to the fact that the highways
were becoming deficient with respect to Interregional design
standards at an increasing rate.
If the recommended system was not designated immediately,
absolete sections of the system would not be replaced to
standards suggested for the Interregional System. An
immediate decision was also necessary if post war excess
employment was to be utilized.
Financing the Interregional System
Based on the accepted principle of reconstruction, it
would take approximately twenty years to complete the system.
Although the total cost of the system would exceed that of
ordinary construction, increased benefits to the user were
anticipated.
In 1941, approximately twenty-one percent of the rural
mileage of the system carried less than 1000 vehicles per
day; these sections of the system were estimated to cost
$40,000 to $60,000 per mile. Thirty-two percent of the
rural mileage of the system carried 1000 to 2000 vehicles
per day and were estimated to cost $50,000 to $70,000 per
mile to upgrade the highway to the proposed standards.
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Twenty-one percent of rural mileage carried 2000 to 3000
vehicles per day; there was a great variation in cost for
these sections because the upper range might require a four-
lane divided highway. Such highways would be required for
over thirty percent of the rural mileage and were definitely
required for volumes of 3000 to 15,000 vehicles per day.
The estimated cost for rural four-lane divided highways
varied from $100,000 to $700,000 per mile.
There was a greater variation in estimated construction
cost for urban sections of the Interregional System than the
rural sections. Construction cost for urban sections did
not vary directly with traffic volume since right-of-way
costs probably accounted for a larger proportion of the cost
variation. Thus, no estimate of the cost of the system was
made for the urban mileage.
The proposed Interregional program had no parallel in
any other fields of public construction. A composite program
with other public works projects was suggested as in
accordance with the principle of providing for the advance
planning and regulated construction of needed public works
for the stabilization of industry and the alleviation of
22
unemployment.
The Committee analyzed records of construction for
prior years to determine the relationship between total
construction volume and the national income. The research
revealed that the volume of public and private construction,
including work relief and maintenance, was closely tied to
fluctuations in the national income. Furthermore, private
and public utility construction expenditures appeared to be
indicators of the health of the national economy. In the
early thirties, public construction expenditures did not
vary with the national economy, and increases in public
construction expenditures failed to offset declines in the
private sector resulting in an unstable economy. Over a
twenty-eight year period from 1915 to 1942, the ratio of
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total construction to national income averaged 14.7 percent
annually. Since maintenance of this relationship appeared
to insure a stable economy, public construction expenditures
must offset any decrease in private construction expenditures
to maintain economic stability. Thus, the principle of
employing public works to stimulate a waning private economy
appeared sound.
A review of Federal and non-Federal expenditures on
highways over the twenty-eight year period from 1915 to 1942
revealed that the average annual expenditure was $1,278
million (2.1 percent of national income) for highway con-
struction and maintenance by all governments. The Federal
government accounted for $121 million (0.2 percent of the
national income) of the average annual highway expenditure.
Local governments spent $715 million (1.1 percent of the
national income) on highway construction and $442 million
on highway maintenance on an average annual basis. [Refer
to Table 2, p. 48 ]• A closer analysis of the expenditure
data for 1931 to 1934 revealed that Federal highway
expenditure increases were more than offset by local govern-
ment reductions in highway expenditures; subsequently, the
increase in Federal highway expenditures failed to fully
stimulate the waning economy in the early thirties. To
prevent the nulification of the proposed Federal post war
effort by states, matching funds would be required from the
States, and the States would be required to maintain the
highways built.
Based on the 1939-42 expenditure period and Federal
work relief, the study suggested that $750 million would
have to be spent annually on highway maintenance to maintain
a stable national income. Maintenance expenditures on high-
ways would have to be greater the first post war years to
overcome the maintenance deferred during the war years.
Approximately $15 billion was to be spent annually for all
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this total, seven billion dollars were for public con-
struction and maintenance; this included three and a half
billion dollars for highway construction and maintenance.
This expenditure was above any previous high in highway
expenditures. However, the Interregional System was
expected to absorb the excess over normal expenditures, and
in no case was the total highway expenditure to drop below
three billion dollars annually.
Using the three billion dollar highway expenditure
figure, two and a quarter billion dollars would be available
for construction after the three-quarters of a billion
dollars had been subtracted for maintenance. As the Inter-
regional system would handle one-fifth of the total vehicle-
miles, it was to receive $450 million annually for construction,
The study suggested that an even greater proportion of the
total highway expenditures would be desirable because the
interregional routes were in need of more improvement and
yielded a greater return of benefits as well as greater road
user tax earnings.
Road user tax earnings for the system were expected to
be double the cost of the rural sections of the system and
triple the cost of the urban sections of the system. For
the above reasons, the Committee recommended a higher
priority for the Interregional System and considered an
expenditure of at least thirty percent and preferably a
third of all highway construction expenditures on the system
justified. This would amount to $750 million instead of
$450 million annually for the system; $500 million of the
total was to go for urban sections of the system. The
Committee felt the higher priority for the interregional





From a physical inventory of existing highways that
coincided with the proposed interregional highway system,
few rural roads and almost no urban roads met the desired
interregional highway design standards. As the interregional
system spanned almost all the States and reached the centers
of greatest anticipated post war employment needs, improve-
ment of the system was presented as a means to utilize the
excess production capacity after the war. Hence, the
National Interregional Highway Committee recommended that
the interregional construction program be initiated upon the
cessation of hostilities, that early legal revisions be made
to insure prompt implementation of the program, and that an
annual expenditure of $750 million be appropriated.
The expenditure rate was based on the level of
expenditure on construction needed to stabilize the economy.
Although designation and development of the interregional
highway system was considered essential to the future growth
and defense of the nation, the report emphasized the con-
struction of the system as a means of preventing the
economic slump that had followed previous wars.
The study did not make a detailed estimate of the total
cost to improve the interregional system. Assuming the
system was constructed at the rate at which existing sections
become obsolete, the study determined that it would take
twenty years to construct the interregional system. Based
on the suggested rate of expenditure, nearly fifteen billion
dollars would be spent to upgrade the system over a twenty
year period. Nevertheless, the study failed to determine
the actual cost of correcting deficiencies in the system.
Congress responded in 1944 with the designation of the
40,000-mile National System of Interstate Highways, but
appropriated no funds specifically for the improvement of
the System. Subsequently, construction of the Interstate
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System failed to keep pace with the increasing traffic
needs in the post war period.
The First Completion Cost Estimate
In 1948, Congress directed the Bureau of Public Roads
to report on the status of improvement of the National System
of Interstate Highways, the potential needs for improved
highways for national defense, and current conditions and
deficiencies of the general highway system in order to
supplement a similar report entitled Highways for the
National Defense dated February 1, 1941. The final report,
Highway Needs of the National Defense , was prepared in close
cooperation with the State highway departments and presented
to Congress in 1949.
In 1948, the Interstate system carried one-fifth of
the rural vehicle miles and one-tenth of the urban vehicle
miles, yet comprised approximately one percent of the total
road mileage. The military had concluded that the Inter-
state System included in its rural sections the roads of
greatest strategic importance. The urban sections of the
System were considered just as essential to defense needs.
Much of the rural road mileage and a substantial
portion of the urban road mileage improved during the past
forty years was found to be seriously obsolete. "Any
complacency we may have as to the present adequacy of these
major roads to serve in peace and in war (was) shattered by
the evidence presented."
24 In 1948, the average age of
the proposed Interstate pavements was twelve years and the
average age of Interstate roadbed was seventeen years.
After ten years of the proposed twenty year rehabilitation
and replacement program, the surfaces on the unreconstructed
portions of the Interstate would average twenty years old
and their roadbeds at least twenty-five years old.
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The increasing obsolescence would be brought about by
the failure of proposed highway improvement to keep pace
with traffic growth. The most serious deficiency of the
highways was their lack of capacity to provide for the
demands of an ever increasing number of registered motor
vehicles. As traffic was concentrated on the Interstate
System, it was considered the most seriously deficient
system in the highway network, especially in urban areas.
These inadequacies were also found to extend to the
remainder of the highway network. The report stressed the
fact that a general upgrading of arterial highway standards
was needed immediately and had been long overdue. The
Bureau of Public Roads recommended that the Interstate be
among the first considered for improvement.
The Interstate System was found to be seriously
deficient in regard to sight distance, width of pavement
and shoulder, and bridges. Alignment problems could only
be corrected through major relocations. If the rural
sections of the System had been improved in 1948, many lives
could have been saved. The savings in time alone at one
cent per minute would have amounted to approximately four-
fifths of the capital cost of improvement.
To merely correct the known critical deficiencies to
tolerable standards, a capital investment of $11,260 million
was required for the System based on 1948 construction
prices. Of the total cost, $5,293 million was needed in
urban areas of 5000 or more in population. To improve the
System for adequacy twenty years hence and to controlled
access standards rather than tolerable standards would
greatly increase the capital investment. In addition, the
cost estimate did not include the cost of improvement of
the 2,300 miles of urban feeder routes, yet to be designated.
Although the total capital improvement costs exceeded
the revenues of a single year, each year's delay in
improving the System would put off possible benefits that
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much longer. The study suggested that $500 million was
needed annually to bring the System up to adequacy in
twenty years, which was considered the longest reasonable
time span. The importance of the System to the economy and
national defense probably justified a more rapid improvement
rate. An increased expenditure rate was possible through
deficit financing amortized over twenty years; the interest
of which would be more than equaled by the benefits thus
derived.
The report further recommended that Federal aid be
continued on other systems to overcome their deficiencies,
that additional funds be earmarked for expenditures on the
Interstate to insure its improvement and that the Federal
share of the Interstate construction be more than the normal
fifty percent of the total project cost. The passage of a
Federal law to permit future allotment of Federal funds to
retire indebtedness incurred by a State in accelerating the
Interstate improvement program would prevent this plan from
discouraging States from accelerating improvement on their
own.
Status of Interstate Improvement
By 1948, 37,800 miles of highway had been designated
for inclusion in the Interstate. The system included 5,969
miles of urban streets (3,778 miles of urban streets in
urban areas of 5000 or more in population and 2,191 miles of
urban streets in incorporated areas of less than 5000 in
population) . This mileage was two percent of the total
316,536 miles of urban streets, carried eleven percent of
the urban vehicle miles in 1948, and averaged 9500 vehicles
per day as compared to other urban streets which averaged
only 1000 vehicles per day. The 31,831 rural miles of the
System consisted of eleven percent of the total 3,009,617
miles of rural roads, carried seventeen percent of the
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rural vehicle miles in 1949, and averaged 2915 vehicles per
day as compared to 1295 vehicles per day for the Federal
Aid Primary System and 1155 vehicles per day for other
roads in the State highway systems. Twenty-seven percent
of the rural vehicle miles on the System could be attributed
to out of state vehicles. In 1940, the Interstate served
651 of the total urban population. All cities of 250,000
or more in population, 49 of the 55 cities in the 100,000 to
250,000 population range, 69 of the 107 cities in the 50,000
to 100,000 population range, and 2538 smaller towns and urban
places were served by the Interstate System. The System
also crossed 1160 of the 3076 counties of the nation and
served fifty percent of the rural population.
A 1948 physical inventory of the Interstate System in-
cluded the type and age of the pavement and roadbed, the
width of pavement and shoulders, other geometric features,
and the capacity and clearances of bridges. The inventory
of road surface revealed that 24 miles were unsurfaced, 144
miles were gravel, 4990 miles were bituminous, and the
remainder high type pavement. [Refer to Table 3, p. 55 ].
The average age of these surfaces was twelve years old; and
the average age of the base was seventeen years old, giving
the System an alignment typical of the year 1932.
The inventory of rural surface widths revealed that
less than twenty percent of the two- lane rural highways had
twenty-four foot pavements, and that only 2,540 miles of
rural highway had four or more lanes of which only 1484 miles
were divided [Refer to Table 4, p. 55 ]. Only a third of the
System had eight-foot shoulders. On the rural portion of
the System, curvatures of greater than three degrees occurred
at 21,869 points or approximately every one and a half miles.
Since only curves less than or equal to three degrees were
negotiable at 70 mph, a very small portion of the System
had an alignment adequate for 70 mph; 2,770 miles of the
System had grades greater than the preferred three percent.
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Stopping sight distances were inadequate on 2087 miles of
the System, and 7,324 miles of the 29,276 miles of two- and
three-lane roads lacked adequate passing sight distance.
Very little of the system was grade separated; this implied
a high degree of conflicts and delays at intersections.
Only one-tenth of the bridges on the System had the desired
H20-S16 (a 36 ton semi-trailer truck) loading capacity and
677 of the 12,048 bridges had less than an H-15 (a 15-ton
truck) loading capacity. Even though most of the bridges
had adequate capacity for 1948 loads and adequate vertical
clearances, many bridges had serious horizontal clearance
problems and only 1863 of 10,050 bridges conformed to Inter-
state standards. In summary, the surface type and traffic
volumes were consistent, but traffic volumes and surface
width were very inconsistent. In other words, the 1948
deficiencies were primarily those of capacity.
From a safety viewpoint, the average rate of fatal
accidents on the Interstate was 9.04 per 100 million
vehicle-miles in 1941 as compared to 9.11 per 100 million
vehicle-miles on all rural highways. Accidents which
resulted in fatalities occurred at a rate of 10.94 per 100
million vehicle miles on the Interstate as compared to 10.66
per 100 million vehicle miles on all rural highways. The
Interstate System appeared to have no better accident record
than other high volume highways; however, as the Interstate
carried a large percentage of the vehicle-miles, it accounted
for a large portion of the absolute death toll.
Correcting the Deficiencies
American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO)
design standards had been adopted for the Interstate System
in 1945. These standards called for adequacy of the high-
way for vehicle volumes and types predicted twenty years
after the initial construction, for a 70 mph design speed,
for a maximum of three degree curves, for a maximum of five
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percent grades, for pavement and structures adequate to
handle 18,000 pound axle loads, for bridges adequate to
handle H20-S16 design loads, for twelve-foot lanes, and for
the outlawing of all three-lane highways. The standards
also required the control of access and the use of frontage
roads if state laws lacked a controlled access provision.
Grade separations were required for railroad crossings
where there were more than six trains per day and for
intersecting roads of 2000 or more vehicles per day.
Finally, both directions of the Interstate were to be de-
signed for the thirtieth highest hourly volume.
At the current rate of replacement, the study determined
that it would take twenty years to build adequate highway
surfaces. To merely correct the 1948 deficiencies in
capacity on the Interstate would require the widening of
8,687 miles, the reconstructing of 14,283 miles through
minor relocation, and the reconstructing of 11,891 miles
through major relocation. This would shorten the System by
641 miles. Only 1900 rural miles and 398 urban miles of
the designated 37,800 miles of the System required no improve-
ment for adequacy in capacity as of 1948.
The total cost of Interstate improvement to 1948
adequacy was estimated at 11,266,400,000 dollars of which
5,293,400,000 dollars was for urban sections. The estimated
cost of Interstate improvement in Indiana was $139,233,370
for the rural sections (906 miles) and $250,203,840 for the
urban sections (159.4 miles). Although Indiana Interstate
mileage was only 2.87 percent of total Interstate mileage,
the Indiana proportion of the total System improvement cost
was 3.46 percent. The study discovered that the cost per
mile of improving the urban sections was 8.7 times the cost
per mile of improving the rural sections and 8.5 times the
cost per mile of improving the entire System. The cost of
improvements on the Interstate came to 18.1 cents per
vehicle mile in 1948, 0.9 cents per vehicle mile over a
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twenty-year period if traffic remained at the 1948 level,
or . 7 cent per vehicle mile over a twenty -year period
considering the anticipated traffic growth over that period.
Retrospect
This was the first study to evaluate the progress of
improvement on the Interstate System since its designation
by Congress in 1944. The study was also the first to
determine the cost of overcoming the System's deficiencies.
The report revealed that critical deficiencies still
existed on the Interstate System and estimated that it would
cost $11,260 million to upgrade the System to adequacy for
1948. The study further suggested that a minimum of $500
million annually was needed to bring the system up to
adequacy in twenty years, which was considered the longest
reasonable time span for improvement.
A shorter period for upgrading the System would result
in greater economic and social benefits. The needs of
national defense also required a more rapid improvement of
the Interstate System. The report suggested that the rate
of improvement could be advanced in time by borrowing
capital which would be amortized over the twenty year
construction period. The study also felt that the interest
on such a loan would be more than equalled by benefits
accruing to the highway user.
At the time of the study, Federal aid funds, authorized
for the Primary and Urban Federal Aid Systems, were being
allotted to projects on the Interstate System at a rate of
approximately $75 million annually. This amount was ten
percent of the $750 million estimate made by the Inter-
regional highway study of 1944 and fifteen percent of the
$500 million estimate of this study. Hence, earmarking of
funds was suggested to assure improvement of the Interstate
System.
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Because of the extraordinary interstate and national
interests attached to the System, Federal participation in
the cost of improvement at a ratio greater than the normal
fifty percent was considered appropriate. If States should
accelerate improvement of the System on their own, it was
considered desirable that a Federal law permit the future
allotment of Federal funds to retire the indebtedness
incurred by the State in accelerating the System improvement,
Although this study estimated the total needs of the
System, it had several shortcomings. The needs estimate was
based on the cost to correct present (1948) deficiencies
to tolerable standards rather than the cost to upgrade the
System to controlled access standards adequate for vehicle
volumes and types predicted twenty years hence. The cost
estimate was restricted to the portion of the System which
had been designated as of 1947. Another 2,300 miles, of
urban feeder routes remained to be designated, yet were
excluded from the estimate. The cost estimate was also
based on 1948 construction prices, and no adjustment was
made for escalation.
One of the most basic assumptions of the study was
later proved to be impractical. The study "considered that
much of the System would be developed by reconstruction and
widening of existing highways and by utilizing existing
major bridges, although they might not in every case by
conveniently located." The needs estimate was founded on
this basic assumption.
More Studies
The National Highway Study
In April, May and June of 1953, extensive hearings were
held by the House Road Subcommittee on the status and
future of Federal Highway programs. The hearings, termed
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the "National Highway Study," made a comprehensive study and
review of the highway problem. The major topics of the
hearings included the recommendations of the 1953 Governors'
Conference that the Federal Government relinquish the tax on
motor fuel to the States and that the activities of the
Bureau of Public Roads be curtailed; and the proposals of
the possibility of placing Federal motor fuel taxes in a-
trust fund for highway purposes, the desirability of
extending turnpikes and toll roads as well as an inter-
continental superhighway, the desirability of Federal
participation in highway maintenance, and increasing the
funds available for the Interstate System.
Through the efforts of the Bureau of Public Roads,
particularly the testimony of Commissioner Francis U.
DuPont, the suggestion to disband the Bureau of Public Roads
and to turn the Federal motor vehicle tax revenues over to
the States was refuted. Utilizing the findings of the 1949
needs study, the Commissioner further stated that the
Interstate System was essential to our defense effort and to
our peacetime economy. Subsequently, he suggested that
Congress apportion funds on a population basis to permit
reasonable progress in improving the System, and that
Congress specify a greater proportion of the total highway
funds for improvement of the Interstate System.
The "National Highway Study" led to the enactment of
the largest Federal aid highway program to date (1954)
.
Nevertheless, subsequent appropriations for the Interstate
System fell far below the actual needs.
DuPont 's Informal Advisory Committee
When President Eisenhower decided to sponsor an
enlarged and accelerated highway program and stressed the
construction of the Interstate System, the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Public Roads (Francis U. DuPont) formed an
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informal advisory committee to discuss the implementation of
such a program. The group considered probable program costs
and means of financing which varied from increased Federal
road user taxes to revenue bonds to the recovery of a share
of the capital gain and property enhancement accruing to
property adjacent to the System. To insure the participation
of all States in the Interstate program, the advisory
committee recommended Federal participation in the neighbor-
hood of ninety percent. The committee also felt that there
should be no compromise in the matter of full access control
for the Interstate System, and that the Interstate program
should be planned and financed in such a way that all States
finished the System simultaneously. Many of these were to
be considered in A 10-Year National Highway Program which
was subsequently developed.
Needs of the Highways from 1955 to 1984
In the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954, Congress again
requested the Bureau of Public Roads to report on the
feasibility of modernizing the highway network through toll
financing and on the cost of modernizing the Nation's
highways
.
Many advocated toll financing as a ready solution to
the problem of financing highway modernization. These
advocates were refuted by the study Progress and Feasibility
of Toll Roads and Their Relation to the Federal-Aid Program
which was presented to Congress in April 1955. The study
determined that only 6,700 miles of highway could be
feasibly financed through tolls, and reaffirmed the
principle that roads built with Federal aid should be toll
free. To prevent wasteful duplication, the report also
recommended that toll roads meeting Interstate standards,
having alternate parallel free roads, and coinciding with
the Interstate routes be incorporated into the Interstate
System.
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The report entitled Needs of the Highway Systems. 1955-
84_ was presented to Congress in March of 1955. This study
was a comprehensive investigation of National highway needs,
the costs to meet these demands, and the financing to
insure improvement. The findings of this report were
incorporated in the document A 10-Year National Highway
Program which is described in detail later in this chapter.
Highway Inadequacy
The 1955 to 1984 needs study estimated that the cost
of needed construction necessary to modernize the nation's
highways would amount to 101 billion dollars over the next
ten years, and that an additional 25 billion dollars would
be required for maintenance and administration during the
same period. The magnitude of highway needs represented by
these figures was an accumulation of needs over many years.
Construction failed to keep pace with traffic increases
after World War II; thus, as the demands for increased
capacity grew, the highway deficiencies began to accumulate.
"In needs studies made during the immediate post war period
(1946-50), the rapid increase in highway usage was viewed by
many as a temporary phenomenon - a leveling-off was
anticipated in the predictable future. Even so, estimates
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of needs showed construction requirements of great magnitude."
In 1954, the leveling-off anticipated had not occurred, and
forecasts for the future predicted a continuation of the
present trend of increasing highway usage. In 1954, 58
million registered vehicles accounted for 557 billion vehicle
miles of travel and it was estimated that there would be
81 million registered vehicles traveling 814 billion vehicle
miles by 1965, a forty percent increase over 1954.
Economic studies based on the 1950 census indicated that
the economy was enjoying vigorous growth, and that the trend
was likely to continue. From 1954 to 1965, a fifty percent
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increase in the Gross National Product was anticipated. The
study further stated that an adequate highway network has
always been essential to sustained economic growth.
There were factors other than traffic growth that led
to the increasing inadequacy of the highway network. In-
creased vehicle weights, higher speeds and heavier axle
loads had caused a serious deterioration of inadequately
designed highways. The four year -moratorium on construction
during World War II had prevented normal maintenance and
replacement, resulting in further deterioration of the high-
way network. However, the failure to keep pace with traffic
growth alone would have made the existing network obsolete.
The failure to control access on major highways led to
the increasing functional inadequacy of the highway network.
The study also discovered that the accident rate for full-
access controlled facilities was forty-two percent of the
accident rate for facilities with no access control, and
the fatality rate for full-access controlled facilities was
thirty-six percent of the fatality rate for facilities with
no access control. The cost of an accelerated highway
program could be justified by a savings in accident costs
and lives alone.
Although these factors led to the increasing inadequacy
of the highway network, the crux of the problem was highway
construction financing. In the face of growing highway
needs, a shortage of revenues for highway construction and
maintenance since 1946 had created a dilemma for highway
agencies. Although the expenditure of funds on high-type
facilities with long service lives was a basically sound
policy when faced with limited funds, the policy generated
great dissatisfaction because other facilities were allowed
to deteriorate. The alternative policy was an across the
board make-do program characterized by short-term, stop-gap
29
work in lieu of needed major improvements. The latter
policy provided temporary relief, not a cure.
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Highway Improvement Estimate
Estimates were based on the cost of improving each
highway system by 1964 to a condition adequate for its
predicted traffic volumes and types in 1964 and in the case
of the Interstate System 1974. Additional estimates were
compiled on the cost to sustain adequacy for twenty years
(1964-1984), assuming adequacy was reached in 1964.
According to the concept of development in the needs
study, the entire Interstate System was to be improved in
ten years (1955-64) to a level of structural (pavement)
adequacy and sufficient lane width (an element of functional
adequacy) for the traffic volumes and types predicted for
1974, and was to be otherwise (alignment, base, drainage,
and right-of-way) adequate for thirty to forty years from
the date of construction. After 1964 the Interstate System
was to be maintained in sound structural and functional
condition. Additional lanes could be added to the System
as traffic needs warranted after 1974.
The Federal Aid Primary System (excluding the Inter-
state) was to be upgraded in ten years (1955-64) to a level
of adequacy for the predicted traffic volumes of 1964.
Specifically, any section improved was to have adequate
lane width for ten years and other geometries for thirty
years from the date of construction. If sections became
structurally or functionally inadequate after 1964, they
were to be rebuilt according to the ten-year concept.
The improvement estimates for remaining systems were
based on shorter service lives and lower types of surfaces.
In the estimate, the highest design standards for up-
grading were, of course, established for the Interstate
System. The design standards for upgrading became
progressively lower as the importance of the system diminished,
The Interstate in 1964 was to be structurally and functionally
adequate for the traffic of 1974. For other principal
systems, portions that were presently inadequate or were
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expected to become inadequate by 1964 based on tolerable
conditions were included in the estimate for replacement or
reconstruction. For local roads and urban streets, there
was great flexibility in tolerable standards by which roads
needing improvement were determined. Hence, despite the
fact that the Bureau of Public Roads developed a cost
estimate guide based on 1954 construction costs to insure
uniformity of the reporting of individual States, uniformity
in the estimates made by individual States could not be
assured.
The study also prefaced its cost estimate with several
general statements. When evidence to support a need was
fully lacking, the estimate was pared down so that it would
not be questioned. This was particularly the case in urban
areas where true needs greatly exceeded the prospects of
meeting them. Hence, the estimates in this needs study
generally reflected financial feasibility rather than
anticipated needs.
Construction Needs for the First Ten Years . From the
data of the individual States, the study estimated that
$101 billion would be needed to modernize the Nation's roads
over a ten-year period. [Refer to Tables 5 and 6, p. 66 ]
.
Indiana had reported that $4,206 million would be needed to
modernize its highways.
About fifteen percent of the 37,700 miles of Interstate
System, as designated in 1954, was adequate according to
the standards set forth by this needs study. No allowance
was made in the cost estimate for an increase in mileage by
the end of 1964, but a fifty percent increase in traveled
lanes by 1964 was taken into consideration. The increase
in traveled lanes would be needed to insure that the System
had adequate capacity for 1974 traffic volumes. Two-lane
highways were adequate for only 7000 miles of the System;
28,000 miles of the System would require four-lane divided
highways and another 2,700 miles of System would require
six or more lanes.
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Interstate 12.5 10.7 23.2
Other Federal Aid Primary !9.9 10.0 299
Federal Aid Secondary, under State iO.I IO.I
Federal Aid Secondary, under Local 4.9 4.9
Total Federal Aid Secondary 15.0 15.0
Subtotal Federal Aid Systems 47.4 20.7 68.1
Other State Highways 3.7 1.8 5.5
Other Roads and Streets 13.3 139 27.2
Subtotal Non- Federal Aid Systems 170 15.7 32.7
Total All Roads and Streets 64.4 36.4 100.8
a Fgures include Hawaii and Puerto Rico ; continental U.S. alone
100.3 billion.
Costs include right-of-way.
TABLE 6 1955-64 INDIANA CONSTRUCTION NEEDS 31
(IN MILLIONS)
System Rural Urban Total
Interstate 475 392 867
Other Federal Aid Primary 816 303 1,119
Federal Aid Secondary, under State 385 385
Federal Aid Secondary, under Local 362 362
Total Federal Aid Secondary 747 747
Subtotal Federal Aid Systems 2,038 695 2,733
Other State Highways 18 33 51
Other Roads and Streets 741 681 1,422
Subtotal Non- Federal Aid Systems 759 714 1,473
Total All Roads and Streets 2,797 1,409 4,206
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Construction costs for the Interstate ranged from
$200,000 per mile for two-lane highways in rural areas to
$10 million per mile for multi-lane sections of six or more
lanes in urban areas. The estimated construction cost for
a four-lane divided highway varied from $450,000 per mile
in rural areas to $1.6 million per mile in urban areas.
According to the States' estimates, the cost of
construction on the Interstate would total $23.2 billion
during the first ten-year period. This figure did not take
into account the expansion of the System to the legislative
limit of 40,000 miles. However, most of the 2,300 miles
of extensions would be in urban areas, and these costs were
to a certain extent included in the cost estimates of other
systems.
The amount of reconstruction and the cost estimates
were less for each system as its importance diminished.
Nevertheless, in absolute values, the cost of replacement
and reconstruction was high. Seventy-five percent of the
Federal aid system, excluding the Interstate, would require
improvement over the next ten years. The overall mileage
of the Federal Aid Primary System was also anticipated to
increase to 201,000 miles (185,000 rural miles and 16,000
urban miles) by 1964. The Federal Aid Secondary System was
expected to increase fifteen percent over the length in
1953 to a length of 530,000 miles in 1964. Other State
highways were expected to increase from 86,000 miles (76,000
rural miles and 10,000 urban miles) to 114,000 miles
(102,000 rural miles and 12,000 urban miles) in 1964; fifty-
nine percent of this existing rural mileage and forty-seven
percent of this existing urban mileage would require improve-
ment. The mileage of other rural roads was expected to
decrease 28,000 miles from 2,300,000 miles, and the mileage
of other urban streets was anticipated to increase 28,000
miles from 320,000 miles by 1964. Fifty-four percent of
this rural and forty-eight percent of this urban existing
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mileage would also need improvement in the initial ten -year
period.
Construction Needs for the Next Twenty Years . With an
expanding population and a continually expanding economy,
transportation needs would continue to grow after the level
of adequacy had been reached in 1964. Thus, even though
future needs would be hard to measure, the failure to plan
for these future needs would result in the reversion of the
highway network's adequacy to a level the same as 1954 in
relative terms. "Simply to sustain the investment in the
highway plant at the stage of development existing in 1964




The future worth of the $101 billion investment
in 1964 would be $140 to $150 billion in 1954 dollars. On
the basis of a thirty to thirty-five year life of investment,
it would require an average construction expenditure of $4
billion or more annually merely to offset the depreciation.
In addition, facilities wear out and require rebuilding.
Provision would also have to be made for substantial up-
grading to take care of further traffic growth. On this
basis, $114.4 billion would be needed for construction to
maintain adequacy for the next twenty years (1965-84).
Needs for the Interstate System from 1965 to 1984 were
expected to be less than half the needs for the first ten
years; $9.7 billion ($5.1 billion in rural areas and $4.6
billion in urban areas) would be needed to maintain
adequacy from 1965 to 1984 compared to $23.2 billion for
construction for the first ten years (1954-1964). For the
other systems the 1965 to 1984 needs were greater than
those for the initial ten-year period. The difference
between the Interstate and other systems was due to the fact
that the Interstate System in 1964 would be adequate for
1974 traffic; whereas, the other systems in 1964 would be
adequate only for 1964 traffic, implying that substantial
upgrading would be required for the other systems after 1965.
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Construction Expenditure . To meet all the highway
construction needs in the initial ten years and to maintain
the level of adequacy for twenty more years would require
a $215.2 billion expenditure on highways from 1955 to 1984.
[Refer to Figure 9, p. 70].
The study suggested an expenditure rate of eight billion
dollars per year for the first five years as the program got
underway. An average expenditure of twelve billion dollars
for the next five years was required as the program
approached its peak and tapered off in 1964. For replacement
*
and expansion of the system after 1964, the rate of
expenditure would vary from $4.3 billion in 1965 to $7.5
billion in 1984.
A more uniform rate of expenditure would have appeared
more consistent with overall economic policies according to
the report. Nevertheless, the Interstate System should have
first priority in any overall program, and the less urgent
needs of the other systems might, therefore, be met more
gradually.
The study reviewed the relationship between highway
construction expenditures and the Gross National Product
(GNP) to insure that expenditures reflected financial
feasibility. In the 1920' s highway construction expenditures
averaged 1.2 percent of the GNP and gradually increased to
a peak of 1.8 percent of the GNP in 1931. The proportion
declined to a low of 1.2 percent of the GNP in 1935, and
gradually rose to 1.7 percent in 1938. Thereafter, construction
expenditures dwindled to a low of 0.2 percent of the GNP
during World War II. The figure climbed to 0.8 percent of
the GNP in 1949, and after 1952 it rose to 1.1 percent of
the GNP in 1954. During the initial ten-year period of
construction, the recommended rate of expenditure would
vary from 1.2 percent of the GNP in 1955 to 3.0 percent in
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expenditure for this ten year period was 2.4 percent of the
GNP. An average of 0.8 percent of the GNP thereafter was
required if construction needs for expansion and replacement
were to continue at a fairly constant proportion of the GNP.
Maintenance and Administrative Needs and Expenditures .
The needs study also determined the maintenance and
administrative costs needed to support the proposed con-
struction program.
For the initial ten-year period, the study estimated
that $19.4 billion would be needed to maintain the highway
network. The Interstate would account for $700 million of
the total maintenance needs for the first ten years. From
1965 to 1984, an additional $48.8 billion would be needed
to maintain the highway network; the Interstate share was
only $2 billion of the total needs for this twenty-year period.
The States had estimated that $1.75 billion would be
spent on highway network maintenance in 1955. For 1965 the
States had estimated that a twenty-two percent increase in
maintenance expenditures over 1955 would be necessary to
maintain the adequacy of the network at the end of the
initial ten-year stage of development. In 1984, total
maintenance might be fifty-seven percent above the 1955 level
for all systems combined.
The study inserted a note of caution on the Interstate
maintenance estimates. "Using the data from the more
experienced States as a guide, it (was) possible that, on a
nationwide basis, the estimate of maintenance needs for the
Interstate System as it (would) exist in 1965 and future
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years (were) understated by about 20%."
Administrative costs were estimated to be less than
five percent of the combined total cost of construction and
maintenance for all systems. The cost of administration for
the initial ten years was determined to be $1.3 billion for
the Interstate System and $5.9 billion for the entire highway
network. For the twenty-year period between 1965 and 1984,
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the administrative cost was estimated to be $0.7 billion for
the Interstate and $7.8 billion for the entire highway net-
work.
Total Needs and Expenditures . The total needs for the
Nation's highway network from 1955 to 1984 were estimated to
be $297.1 billion out of which seventy-two percent was for
construction, twenty- three percent was for maintenance and
five percent was for administration. From 1955 to 1964, the
need totaled $126.1 billion out of which $100.8 billion was
for construction, $19.4 billion was for maintenance and
$5.9 billion was for administration. From 1965 to 1984, the
total need for all systems would be $171.0 billion out of
which $114.4 billion was for construction, $48.8 billion was
for maintenance and $7.8 billion for administration. The
total needs averaged about $9.9 billion annually over the
thirty year period. In comparison only $6.1 billion was
spent in 1954. Figures 10 and 11 (p. 73 and p. 74 ) give
a graphical description of the rate of expenditures to meet
the needs of the entire network and the Interstate System
alone.
Highway Improvement Financing
If the present structures and rates of highway user
taxes were continued (even if consideration was given to the
estimated increase in motor vehicle registration and motor
fuel consumption over the next ten years) and if the current
rates of expenditure on maintenance and administration were
continued, the study estimated that $47 billion in revenues
would be available for highway construction from 1955 to
1964. Consequently, a $54 billion deficit would have to be
overcome if the estimated initial ten-year needs were to be
met.
The needs for the subsequent ten-year periods were less











FIGURE 10. RATE OF EXPENDITURE BASED ON
NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE

































FIGURE RATE OF EXPENDITURE BASED ON
INTERSTATE CONSTRUCTION,
MAINTENANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
NEEDS FROM 1954 TO I984 36
75
highway needs after 1964 was not as pressing a problem.
Since the Interstate was to be completed in the initial ten-
year period (1955-64) for 1974 traffic, expenditure needs
of the System would drop sharply after 1964. The cost of
construction, maintenance and administration would continue
to be substantial and would steadily increase; however,
overall expenditures would be lower than for the initial
ten-year stage.
Having determined the needs, the study next had to
make decisions on the proportion of the improvement cost
born by each governmental jurisdiction and the means of
financing the improvement (general taxation, highway user
taxations, general obligations bonds or toll revenue bonds).
However, these decisions were left to the President's
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program. Their
report A 10-Year National Highway Program appears later in
this chapter. The financial findings of the Advisory
Committee were merely adopted from this needs study.
Conclusion
This needs study documented the increasing inadequacy
of the Nation's highway network and determined that the
Interstate System was the most critically deficient system
in the network. The study further described the probable
causes of the highway problem and barriers to its resolution.
The importance of an adequate highway network to the National
economy was stressed, and the relationships between highway
expenditures and the National economy were described.
Finally, the study estimated the cost of bringing the
Nation's highway network to a level of adequacy in ten years
and the cost of maintaining the level of adequacy for the
next twenty years.
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The needs study estimated that $23.2 billion was
needed over the initial ten-year period (1955-64) to upgrade
the Interstate System for the predicted traffic of 1974.
Again, the estimate was restricted essentially to that
portion of the System which had been designated in 1947 and
did not include the cost of 2,300 miles of urban feeder
routes for extension of the System to the 40,000-mile
statutory limit. The cost estimate was generally based on
1954 construction prices without an adjustment for
escalation.
Nevertheless , the new cost estimate for improvement of
the Interstate System was double that of the 1949 needs study.
This time the estimate was based on the cost of upgrading the
Interstate in ten years (1955-64) to a level of adequacy for
the predicted traffic of 1974 (almost twenty years hence)
rather than the cost of eliminating the present deficiencies
of the system over a twenty-year period. The 1954 needs
study adopted limited-access control standards as the
basis of the needs estimate rather than tolerable standards
which was the case in 1949. There was now a recognition of
need for extensive relocation of the System rather than the
mere upgrading of existing highways. These factors account
for much of the difference from the 1949 cost estimate.
The report further acknowledged that the estimate
tended to reflect financial feasibility rather than anti-
cipated needs, and that the States with less experience in
constructing limited-access highways tended to underestimate
their needs. This inexperience was to result in substantially
higher cost estimates for completing the Interstate in the
future.
The National Highway Program Study
The concept of a drastically improved highway system
was formally presented on behalf of President Eisenhower by
Vice President Nixon at the Governors' Conference on July
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12, 1954. The Nation's highway network was inadequate and
obsolete. Consequently, the President specifically called
for "a grand plan for a properly articulated (highway) system
that solves the problems of speedy, safe transcontinental
travel - intercity transportation - access highways - and
farm to farm movement - metropolitan area congestion -
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bottlenecks - and parking." The President suggested $5
billion annually for the next ten years in addition to
current highway expenditures. This added expenditure would
pay off in economic growth.
The highway improvement program was designed to achieve
better or more adequate highways and not more highways. The
representatives of the railroads pointed out the competitive
threat of improved highways and increased truck haulage;
they would eventually be placated by the financial arrange-
ments for highway construction.
The Federal government had at present matched State
funds in expenditures on the Federal Aid Primary, Secondary,
and Urban Extensions. From the viewpoint of National
interest, some sections of the Primary System were considered
more important than others; thus, in 1944 Congress authorized
the selection of a special network, the National System of
Interstate Highways, to connect principle metropolitan areas,
major cities and industrial centers, to serve the national
defense, and to connect continental routes in Canada and
Mexico. In 1954, the System comprised 1.2 percent of the
total road mileage and joined forty-two State capitals and
ninety percent of all cities over 50,000 in population. The
System carried one-seventh of all traffic and one-fifth of
all rural traffic, served sixty-five percent of the urban
and forty- five percent of the rural populations, and was
the key system from the standpoint of Federal interest in
productivity and National security. A total of 37,700 miles
of the 40,000-mile System had been designated by 1954.
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Following up his message to the governors, President
Eisenhower appointed an Advisory Committee on a National
Highway Program headed by General Lucius D. Clay. The
Committee reviewed past investigations of the Nation's high-
way program (including those on the Interstate System) and
conducted extensive investigations of their own. Their
report, A 10-Year National Highway Program , was transmitted
to Congress in February of 1955.
This program recommended that Congress authorize long
term highway financing, whereby the existing level of
Federal aid would be continued and additional funds would be
concentrated for ten years on modernizing the 40,000-mile
National System of Interstate Highways. The program was to
be self-liquidating since the funds to be utilized in con-
struction would be equivalent to the revenues anticipated
from Federal taxes on gasoline and lubricating oils.
Program Recommendations
A safe and efficient highway network was essential to
America's military and civil defense and to the American
economy. The existing Interstate System was found to be
inadequate for both current and future needs and would have
to be improved to meet the requirements of a growing
population and an expanding economy.
Over the next ten years, $101 billion was needed to
upgrade all highway systems, including the 37,700 designated
miles of Interstate System to meet future needs. The cost
of modernizing the presently designated Interstate System
and urban connecting arterials amounted to $27 billion alone.
The President's Advisory Committee on the National
Highway Program recommended that the Federal government's
share of all highway construction be increased to thirty
percent and that the Federal government assume prime
responsibility in financing the modernization of the Inter-
state system. The federal share of the total highway
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construction cost amounted to $31,225 billion for the ten-
year period. The Federal Interstate responsibility would
average $2.5 billion annually for a ten-year period, and the
State and local governments would provide the remaining $2
billion. The traditional Federal aid to States was to be
continued at the same level as authorized by Congress in
1954 - $525 million annually for the Federal Aid Primary
and Secondary Systems, $75 million for Federal Aid Urban
Extensions excluding those in the Interstate System, and
$22.5 million for forest highways. The Interstate System
was to be omitted from this traditional authorization, and
an additional authorization was to be made specifically for
the Interstate System.
The Federal share of the Interstate System construction
cost, which amounted to $25 billion, or approximately ninety
percent of the total Interstate cost, was to be financed by
$20 billion of bonds to be issued by a Federal Highway
Corporation created by Congress. The total finance cost
was expected to approximate the two -cent Federal gasoline
and lubricating oil tax over a 32-year period, and it was
anticipated that the revenue bonds would be repaid over the
32-year period by these revenues.
The Federal Highway Corporation was to have a Board of
Directors composed of three citizens, appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, with the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce as ex officio
members. The Secretary of Defense was to be an ex officio
member of the Board in all matters relating to highway
location. The primary responsibility of the Board of
Directors was that of determining financial policy and that
of serving as an appeals board to resolve differences between
Federal and State authorities.
Toll roads were to be included in the Interstate System
if they were built to acceptable Interstate standards. How-
ever, toll financing was not deemed the solution to the
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problem of network modernization. A toll road feasibility
study requested of the Bureau of Public Roads by Congress
in 1954 substantiated this belief. This study, Progress and
Feasibility of Toll Roads and Their Relation to the Federal-
Aid Program , indicated that only 6,700 miles of the Interstate
System could be feasibly financed through tolls.
The Advisory Committee also suggested that credit be ex-
tended to States for sections of the Interstate already com-
pleted, provided the funds were utilized for further highway
improvement.
Finally, the States would have to modernize highway
enabling laws, particularly in connection with land acquisi-
tion, the control of access, and cooperation between State,
city and county in highway management. It was suggested
that Congress provide for the use of eminent domain to
acquire right-of-way for the Interstate System if acquisi-
tion of full-access control right-of-way proved infeasible
through the normal exercise of State law.
Most of these recommendations were to become law in the
future, but many were to be revised drastically.
Inadequacy of the Present Highway Network
The Committee's report documented the inadequacy of the
1954 highway network; this had been described in greater
detail in the 1955-84 needs study. Briefly, highway con-
struction had failed to keep pace with the ever increasing
traffic demand. Eventually, the lack of an adequate trans-
portation system would have serious economic repercussions.
The Advisory Committee felt that the cost of an accelerated
program to modernize the system could be justified by in-
creased highway user benefits alone.
Many highways had become obsolete because of the failure
to control access. Thus, an Interstate System with full
-
access control and complete grade separation was considered
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essential. It was recognized that service or frontage roads
would be required for local traffic, raising the ultimate
cost of the Interstate System. In urban and suburban areas,
the Advisory Committee reaffirmed the belief that it would
probably be more economical to relocate the Interstate routes
than to acquire the additional land necessary to permit full-
access control.
Cost of Modernization
In section 13 of the 1954 Federal-Aid Highway Act, the
Congress directed the Secretary of Commerce to make a com-
prehensive study of all phases of highway financing, including
a study of the cost of completing the several systems of
highways. Estimates for the modernization of the Nation's
roads over the next ten years were prepared by the Bureau of
Public Roads in cooperation with the highway departments of
each State. The report, Needs of the Highway Systems, 1955-
1984 , was presented to Congress in the Spring of 1955. As
the report was described in detail in the last sub-chapter,
only the major points that relate to the "national highway
program" are discussed herein. The cost figures of the needs
study were adopted by the President's Advisory Committee for
the National Highway Program.
Estimates were prepared on the cost of upgrading each
system in ten years to a level adequate for the traffic vol-
umes predicted in 1964 except for the Interstate System where
the predicted traffic in 1974 was to be used. Assumming the
level of adequacy was reached in 1964, estimates were then
made to sustain the level of adequacy for the next twenty
years, 1965 to 1984. Existing and programmed toll roads were
also included in the estimate, and 1954 construction prices
were used as a basis for the estimated costs.
From the cost estimates, it was determined that $101
billion would be needed to modernize the Nation's roads
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over a ten-year period. The Interstate System would account
for $23 billion of the Nation's needs. However, this figure
did not take into account expansion of the System to the
legislative limit of 40,000 miles. Most of these Interstate
extensions were urban, however, and (to a certain extent) were
estimated in the costs of other systems.
For the Interstate System to be fully effective, it had
to be tied to existing arterials in congested urban areas.
Studies showed that these urban feeder routes would add
approximately another $4 billion to the total Interstate
System construction cost. Transferring $4 billion from the
needs of the other systems for the 2300 miles of urban
Interstate extensions , the Interstate System and its urban
feeders could be constructed at an overall estimated cost
of $27 billion over a ten-year period, assuming no increasing
trend other than traffic growth.
The Interstate System was given construction priority
because of its importance to the National economy and defense.
To preserve the purpose for which it was intended, a primary
feature of the Interstate System was the provision for ade-
quate right-of-way to permit full-access control. Grade
separation structures were required for all intersecting
routes, not closed at the Interstate right-of-way line, and
for all intersected routes that were to have access to the
Interstate. These latter steps would further preserve the
capacity of the System and insure maximum safety.
Under the standards developed for the "national highway
program", 7,000 miles of the Interstate System would remain
two- lane highways when completed to 1974 standards. After
1974, additional lanes could be added to the Interstate
System to preserve its level of adequacy. [Refer to Figure
12, p. 83 ]
.
In constructing a fully controlled access system, the




































free enterprise and preventing monopolistic tendencies in
providing highway user services such as food, fuel and
lodging.
Financing the National Highway Program
If allowance was made for the anticipated growth in
vehicle registration and usage, if the present highway user
tax structure was continued, and if the current rates of
expenditure for maintenance were continued, only $47 billion
in Federal, State and local revenues would become available
for highway construction over the next ten years. Because
the ten-year needs for all systems amounted to $101 billion,
a $54 billion deficit would have to be overcome. Decisions
had to be made as to the proportion of the total cost to be
born by each governmental jurisdiction and the means of
financing such cost.
The Executive Committee of the Governors 1 Conference
recommended that the Federal government assume primary res-
ponsibility, with some State participation, for financing
construction on the Interstate System and its urban feeder
routes, and that the Federal government continue to allocate
Federal user taxes to the States for highway construction
on other Federal aid systems without change. The President's
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program reiterated
these recommendations and suggested that the Federal govern-
ment bear thirty percent of the total cost and approximately
ninety percent of the Interstate cost. The proposed 10-year
national highway program financing appears in Table 7, p. 85 .
The Federal share of the total highway needs over the
next ten years was approximately $31 billion. In the past,
the States had been required to contribute to obtain funds
from the $175 million made available annually for the Interstate
by the Federal Government. Since the States were not ex-
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would have to provide approximately $25 billion of the total
$27 billion Interstate construction cost.
The States would provide the remaining $2 billion for
the Interstate. Matching requirements on the other Federal
Aid Systems would result in a little less than $6,225 billion
in State and local funds. This meant the State and local
governments would have to provide an additional $32.55 billion
above their matching funds to meet the ten-year total cost
of Federal Aid Systems other than the Interstate. Adding
the $29 billion ten-year cost for other State and local road,
the total State and local share of the national highway pro-
gram came to nearly $70 billion over the ten-year period.
Having determined the proposed expenditures for the
various systems and the financial responsibility for these
systems, the President's Advisory Committee on a National
Highway Program had to determine the source of funding for
the program and particularly the means of overcoming the
$54 billion deficit. Possible means of financing the program
included general taxation, highway user taxation, or deficit
financing through general obligation or toll revenue bonds.
As of December of 1954, 5,242 miles of feasible toll
roads which paralleled or coincided with the Interstate
System in twenty-three States were in operation, under con-
struction, financed or authorized. Proposals in these and
five more States would bring the mileage, coinciding with
the Interstate, to 8,527 miles, excluding unfeasible mileage.
Indiana had the 157-mile East-West Turnpike under construction,
the 150-mile Hammond- Indianapolis toll road under authoriza-
tion, the 110 mile Indianapolis-Kentucky Line toll road (which
proved unfeasible), and 110 mile Indianapolis-Cincinnati
toll road under proposal.
Although toll financing on a sound basis could meet the
needs of a limited portion of the Interstate System, it
could not support the needs of the total System because many
portions of the System could not be feasibly financed through
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tolls. The Advisory Committee felt that "the Federal gov-
ernment should not enter into toll road construction nor
provide funds for the deficit financing of otherwise non-
self supporting projects." 40 Major Interstate structures
such as bridges and tunnels might be toll financed when
economically feasible; but this determination was left to
the State and the proposed Federal Highway Corporation.
In the past, approximately half of the States had
planned to meet their Interstate needs by constructing
toll-free expressways to design standards equaling or ex-
ceeding toll financed facilities. These free facilities
were to be financed from current revenues or bond issues
of the State, amortized through gasoline taxes and license
fees. However, neither State nor toll financing would be
adequate to modernize the entire Interstate System in ten
years.
As the Committee did not want to discourage States from
constructing sections of the Interstate with State or toll
financing, the Committee suggested that States receive
credit for sections of the Interstate already completed
if these sections met completed Interstate System standards
and if the reimbursed funds were used to improve other
Federal aid systems. No Federal funds were to be used for
toll roads unless returns from tolls above financing would
go for the construction of other Federal aid highways.
To limit the Federal liability for past construction
with State or toll financing, credit for roads built from
1947 to 1951 was limited to those sections which coincided
with the Interstate and met the new Interstate standards and
then only to a maximum of forty percent of the construction
cost excluding financing. Credit for roads built from 1952
to 1955 was limited to a maximum of seventy percent for
sections that coincided with the Interstate and met the new
Interstate standards. However, no Federal fund credit
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would be allowed in excess of the remaining amortization.
Roads built after 1955 would be credited at their total
cost.
To make up the deficiency in revenues for the Federal
share of total national highway program cost, which in effect
amounted to the Federal cost of the Interstate, the Advisory
Committee proposed the creation of a Federal Highway Corpora-
tion to finance the Interstate construction. The proposed
Federal Highway Corporation was to be empowered by Congress
to issue bonds and to utilize the proceeds for the following
purposes: (1) to pay the States the Federal share of the
Interstate construction cost; (2) to appropriate credit to
the States for sections of the Interstate already built;
(3) to cover the cost of administration, research, and
planning in the Corporation; (4) to establish a revolving
fund for the States enabling them to pursue the program,
pending receipt of the payments above; and (5) to possibly
make loans to those States which lacked Interstate matching
funds. 41
The Corporation would be authorized to issue $20 billion
of taxable bonds, at three percent interest, to meet its
share of the cost of completing the Interstate in ten years.
The allocations for the Interstate program were expected to
approximate the receipts from the two-cent Federal tax on
gasoline and lubricating oil in excess of the annual $622.5 millioi
covering the Federal cost of the other Federal aid systems.
Temporary borrowing was also possible from the Treasury if
receipts fell temporarily behind the appropriations to the
States. From Table 8 (p. 89 ) financing the cost of the
Interstate program by bond issues over a thirty-one year
period from 1956 to 1987 would amount to $11,548 billion in
interest. Unfortunately, the committee report covered only
the Federal share of the $54 billion deficit for the total
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the States would overcome their share of the deficit.
The question of financing was by no means settled by
the President's Advisory Committee on a National Highway
Program and was a constant subject of debate until passage
of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956.
Implementation of the National Highway Program
The Federal Highway Corporation was to be responsible
for the administration of the program. While the Federal
Highway Corporation Board of Directors was principally con-
cerned with financial management, it was to serve as a
board of appeals for disputes between the States and Bureau
of Public Roads.
A shortage of engineers and technical personnel might
have caused Interstate program implementation problems;
however, the use of private engineering organizations, sim-
plified procedures and standardized specifications for the
long-range program were expected to reduce engineering re-
quirements .
Surveys were made by the American Road Builder's
Association and the Associated General Contractors of America
concerning the adequacy of materials and contractors to
carry out the Interstate program. These organizations
assured the Advisory Committee that the program was feasible
because the lenght of the program allowed latitude for
training needed personnel. The American Association of
State Highway Officials substantiated this contention.
Revision of enabling legislation, governoring the
financing and construction of State highways, would be needed
for efficient execution of the national highway program.
Areas needing extensive revision included advance acquisi-
tion of right-of-way, control of access, and the cooperative
working agreements between State and local agencies. The
Committee suggested that the Federal government could be
91
enabled to exercise its right of eminent domain to acquire
Interstate right-of-way when a State was unable to do so.
Report Conclusion
At the present level of expenditure, $47 billion would
be spent on highway improvement over a ten-year period be-
ginning in 1956. Because the total needs of the highway
systems were $101 billion, a $54 billion deficit would exist.
The Federal government would assume approximately half of
this deficit by financing its share of the Interstate through
bonds. However, the Committee offered no suggestions as to
how the State and local governments were to overcome their
share of the deficit.
While the national highway program proposal had many
attractive aspects, there were several features that weighed
against its adoption. The plan placed a thirty-two year
ceiling on the regular Federal aid highway programs, excluding
the Interstate. Deficit financing of the Interstate program
would cost $12 billion in bond interest. The creation of
the Federal Highway Corporation would, in effect, remove
fiscal control of the program from Congress.
In support of the proposed scheme of deficit financing
for the Interstate, the President's Advisory Committee on a
National Highway Program had the following comment: "It
(committee) also is sympathetic to "pay-as-you-go" financing.
However, in this instance, the advantages of a modern,
efficient national highway network to be completed in 10
years to meet the traffic demands to be reached a decade
later, and with a minimum life of 30 years justifies its
financing through a bond issue to be retired during the use-
ful like of the system." 43 The increase in Federal expen-
ditures of $25 billion for Interstate highways was consi-
ered vital to national growth.
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THE PROGRAM AND ITS EVOLUTION
In the 1930' s, there was a growing awareness of the
inadequacy of the existing intercity highways, and a system
of expressways spanning the nation was conceived as a possible
solution. Goals and objectives for the interstate system
were defined by various studies and legislation. To accomplish
the goals, many studies attempted to determine the deficien-
cies of the highway network and to formulate a program to
correct the deficiencies and, thereby, realize the goals of
the interstate system. Over time, the studies documented
the ever increasing deficiencies of the Nation's highway
network, particularly the existing highways coinciding with
the interstate system.
In 1944, Congress authorized the designation of 40,000
miles of Interstate highways, but appropriated no money spec-
ifically for the System. As improvement of the Interstate
and other systems was delayed, highway needs continued to
grow; and the cost of improvement began to correspondingly
increase. The later studies concluded that many of the
existing highways coinciding with the Interstate would have
to be relocated, that present revenues and expenditures were
inadequate to meet the total highway needs, and that some
means of overcoming the financial problem must be found.
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1952 was the first leg-
islative action to provide funding for the Interstate System.
The 1954 Federal Aid Highway Act increased the Interstate authori
zations, but Interstate funding still fell far short of act-
ual needs. Finally, Congress responded by authorizing a
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comprehensive Interstate System program in the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1956 and by creating a highway fund in the
companion Highway Revenue Act of 1956 to provide adequate
revenues for the Interstate Program as well as other system
programs. These two acts established the authorizations
and revenues necessary to complete the Interstate System
within a fixed time period, and set forth the essential
elements of the current Interstate Program.
This chapter reviews the Program and its evolution.
Construction Time
The Interregional Highway study of 1944 had suggested
that the Interstate System be upgraded over a period of
twenty years. This was a rate of improvement based on the
replacement of the Interstate sections as they became obsolete.
Because the Interstate System carried the greatest number of
vehicle miles in relation to its length and was the most
deficient system in the highway network, its improvement was
considered essential to the economy and national defense by
the 1955 national highway program study. Thus, the President's
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program recommended
improvement of the Interstate System to a level of adequacy
in ten years (1955-1964) for the predicted traffic volumes
of 1974. In the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, Congress ex-
panded the Interstate Program to thirteen years to permit
I
the proposed financing to match the authorizations. The
longer period would also give the States time for advance
preparation and planning in implementing the Interstate
Program. Congress had felt that it would take the States
a couple of years to gear up and get the Program in full
swing.
After the Interstate Program had been underway for a
few years, it was soon realized that proposed financing
would not match the authorization rate. To compound the
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problem, the cost of the Interstate Program was continually
on the increase due to a combination of factors: higher
design standards, increases in original mileage, the emphasis
on the environment, relocation compensation and services,
inflation and a variety of other changes in standards and
regulations. Consequently, financing was to continually
fall behind the authorizations needed to complete the Program
in the time allotted. Congress responded by stretching out
the Program so that revenues would more nearly match the
Interstate costs.
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1964 expanded the Program
from thirteen to fifteen years and the completion date from
June 30, 1969 to June 30, 1971. In 1966 the completion date
was moved to June 30, 1972. Congress expanded the Program
to eighteen years by means of the 1968 Federal Aid Highway
Act. On December 31 of 1970, the completion date was moved
to June 30, 1976 which was still in effect at the time this
report was compiled. As the Interstate System neared com-
pletion in 1972, construction priority was shifted from the
Interstate System to the other Federal aid systems. This
resulted in proposals before Congress to move the completion
date to 1984 or later.
As the Federal government has the primary responsibility
of funding the Interstate Program and Congress has called
for simultaneous completion of the entire System, Indiana
could only utilize the funds made available and could not
complete its portion of the System earlier. Some States were
able to utilize deficit financing for Interstate construc-
tion; this allowed more rapid construction with State funds
early in the Program. Indiana's present constitution pre-
vents deficit financing, and Indiana had to build on a
"pay as you go" basis. Nevertheless, over time Indiana
has completed as much, if not more of its System, than the
States which utilized deficit financing. As Congress
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adopted a "pay as you go" policy, States were appropriated
funds on the basis of the cost to complete the System in
the State; thus, States which used deficit financing had
little advantage in completing their portion of the System
sooner.
Manpower
There was concern that there would not be enough labor
for the construction of a project of such magnitude. However,
the contractors and labor unions assured the President's
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program in 1955 that
the length of the Interstate Program would allow sufficient
time to train construction laborors if a deficiency should
appear early in the Program.
It might be noted that the Interstate Program was in-
tended to utilize the labor released from war time production
in 1945. Because the Federal government has sought to main-
tain a stable economy through the regulation of Federal ex-
penditures, spending on the Interstate Program emerged as one
means for such stabilization. Increased Federal expenditure
on the Program would stimulate the construction industry and
also draw unemployed labor into it. Throughout the Interstate
Program, Federal expenditures were regulated in an attempt to
stabilize the economy.
Because of the magnitude of the Program, there was a
shortage of qualified engineers initially to plan and de-
sign the new routes. Again the length of the Program would
hopefully ameliorate the engineer deficiency. It was also
hoped that standardized designs for the Interstate would
reduce the amount of engineering work. Obviously, the State
highway departments would have to expand their personnel or
rely more heavily on private consulting firms.
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Material and Equipment
The National Highway Program study revealed that there
were sufficient material resources and construction equip-
ment in most areas. Furthermore, the Federal government
encouraged the participation of small businesses in the
Interstate Program to assure sufficient resources. However,
bids were still required to be on a competitive basis.
Financing in General
Federal Highway Trust Fund
The Highway Revenue Act of 1956 created the mechanism
to insure implementation of the Interstate Program as well
as continue the National Highway Program. This mechanism
was the Federal Highway Trust Fund which created a link
between Federal highway user taxes and Federal aid for high-
ways .
The Trust Fund was to achieve several objectives. It
provided funding on a continual basis for a long-range Federal
aid program. This would enable States to set up their own
long-range programs and allow them to establish construction
priorities. In the past, highway programs were short in
nature since the source of future funding was always in
doubt. Continuous funding would make the long-range program
less subject to the whims of the politicians.
The Trust Fund would provide funding to complete the
Interstate Program as well as funds for the other Federal
aid systems. The Trust Fund also served as a mechanism to
limit competition with other transportation modes. Since
highway user taxes were earmarked for highway construction,
those who benefited from the highways paid for the benefits
so that highway financing was not an outright subsidization
of a particular mode of transportation. This factor placated
the railroad lobby and assured the funding of the Interstate
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Program. The 1956 Revenue Act also confined the National
Highway Program to a pay-as-you-go basis.
The Federal Highway Trust Fund was created by the
transfer of a variety of highway user taxes from the General Fund
and some new taxes. These included motor fuel taxes, excise
taxes on new commercial vehicles, taxes on rubber and taxes
on the use of certain vehicles. The tax rates, the percen-
tage of a particular tax assigned to the Trust Fund, and the
particular taxes assigned to the Trust Fund were varied
throughout the Interstate Program.
Initially, the tax on motor fuel was increased from two
to three cents per gallon except for non-highway vehicles
and uses not requiring vehicle registration and was entirely
earmarked for the Trust Fund with minor exceptions. The
excise tax on new commercial vehicles was increased from
eight to ten percent with half going to the Trust Fund. The
tax on highway vehicle tires was increased from five to eight
cents per pound; taxes on other tires and inner tubes re-
mained at five and nine cents per pound, respectively; and
a new tax of three cents per pound was levied on tread rubber.
All the rubber taxes went into the Trust Fund. Congress also
levied a new tax at $1.50 per year per 1000 pounds on highway
vehicles in excess of 26,000 pounds; this tax went entirely
to the Trust Fund. The Trust Fund was to terminate on July
1, 1972 and the taxes were to revert to their original rate.
However, the life of the Trust Fund has since been extended.
In the operation of the Federal Highway Trust Fund,
Congress made the following policy declaration in the Highway
Revenue Act of 1956:
"That the total receipts of the trust fund
will be less than the total expenditures
from such Fund or that the distribution of
the tax burden among the various classes of
persons using the Federal-aid highways, or
otherwise deriving benefits from such highways
is not equitable, the Congress shall enact
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legislation in order to bring about a balance
of total receipts and expenditures, or such
equitable distribution, as the case may be." 2
It was recognized that expenditures would exceed revenues
in the earlier years of the Trust Fund, but the deficit
would be overcome by excess revenues in the later years. To
cover the temporary deficits in the early years, a provision
was added to the 1956 Revenue Act to permit borrowing with
interest from the U. S. Treasury. However, this provision
was nullified by the Byrd Amendment which required a strict
pay-as-you-go financing. If a deficit in the Trust Fund
was anticipated, Interstate apportionments to the States
would be reduced to prevent a deficit in the Highway Trust
Fund according to the Byrd Amendment. Thus, the borrowing
provision was inoperative except for less than a year.
Although the Trust Fund established a continuous source of
funds for highway construction, Congress had to make con-
tinuous adjustments in the apportionments to keep the ex-
penditures and revenues in balance. Thus, Congress retained
control of the Interstate Program and other Federal aid
programs. Congress also requested the Bureau of Public Roads to
make a highway cost allocation study. The purpose of the
study was the determination of an equitable distribution of
the highway user tax burden on the various classes of vehicles
utilizing the highways.
Highway Acts
The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 was a landmark in
the national highway program. It authorized the completion
of an entire highway system - the Interstate System. Al-
though the basic Federal - State relationship was unaffected,
it departed from the traditional 50-50 Federal - State sharing
of costs and traditional apportionment formula. The Act also
added the word Defense to the National System of Interstate
Highways name - National System of Interstate and Defense
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Highways. The act most notably accelerated the highway im-
provement program and brought about a new era in highway
transportation.
Apportionment of Funds . The traditional fixed factor
empirical formula for the apportionment of Primary and
Secondary Federal Aid System funds was based one-third on
population, one-third on area, and one-third on the mileage
of rural delivery routes and star routes of each State in
relation to that of all the States with no State receiving
less than half a percent of the monies for each system. The
appropriation formula for the Urban Federal Aid System was
based on the ratio of population in urban places of 5000 or
more in each State to that of all the states. Prior to the
Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954, apportionments for the
Interstate System had been on the same basis as the Primary
and Secondary Systems. In 1954, the traditional formula
was considered inadequate to meet the construction needs of
the Interstate System, particularly in urban areas. Because
population and congestion were directly related, Congress
altered the traditional formula for the Interstate System to
give greater weight to population. The 1954 Interstate
appropriation formula was based half on population and half
on the traditional formula. This in effect resulted in an
apportionment formula based two- thirds on population, one-sixth
on land, and one-sixth on the mileage of rural delivery routes
and star routes.
In developing the 1956 Act, the congressional faction
led by Senator Gore maintained that the 1954 Interstate
empirical apportionment formula should be the basic formula
for the continued allocation of Interstate funds to the
States. They felt that an apportionment based on needs, as
set forth in the study Needs of the Highway Systems, 1955-84 ,
would penalize those States that had done a poor job of
estimating costs. The Senate report on the bill stated as
follows:
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"The figures contained in this table (the 1955-84
Needs Study) were compiled by the Bureau of Public
Roads from estimates submitted by the various
States as to the expected cost of correcting criti-
cal deficiencies in their highway systems. No
standard criteria were used by the several States
in submitting their estimates. Obviously many of
the estimates are low. Few of them were based
upon objective surveys of probable actual cost.
An analysis of these estimates, when related to
interstate mileage and terrain within the States,
indicates that they are in large measure unrealistic
The Committee (Public Works Committee of the
Senate) believes it would be wholly unsound to
initiate so important a program with apportionment
of funds calculated on so inequitable a basis."'
The Senate faction further felt that no State would be able
to plan its program intelligently without knowledge of the
amount of funds that would become available in the future.
If the allocation formula was based on the cost to complete
the System, as estimated by the States, Congress would lose
control over the apportionment of the Interstate program
funds
.
The opposing faction in the House, led by Representative
Fallon, felt the traditional formula would never meet the
objective of completing the designated System simultaneously
throughout the States within the prescribed time. They
recommended an apportionment based on the ratio of each
States' estimate to complete the System to that of all the
States. The traditional foumula was empirical in nature and
inherently failed to reflect the actual needs for improvement.
The House bill apportioned the Interstate funds authorized
for fiscal years 1957 and 1958 on the basis of the estimate
of cost to complete the Interstate System as stated in the
Needs of the Highway Systems, 1955-84 . For fiscal 1959
through 1969 apportionments were to be made on the basis of
revised estimates approved by resolution of both houses.
The successive estimate procedure was a self-correcting pro-
cess whereby previous inaccuracies in a States' estimate
103
would be compensated such that each State had the funds to
complete the System in the final year of the Program.
The differences of opinion were resolved in a compromise.
Apportionments for fiscal years 1957, 1958 and 1959 were to
be on the basis of the 1954 Interstate empirical formula of
two-thirds population, one-sixth area and one-sixth mileage
of rural delivery and star routes of each States in ratio
to that of all States. Apportionments for subsequent years
were to be based upon revised estimates of cost to complete
the System developed by the individual State in cooperation
with the Bureau of Public Roads.
During the first three years of the accelerated Inter-
state Program, the apportionments were unrelated to the needs.
This resulted in a poor showing in the use of funds and in
the completion of Interstate mileage. Several years would
pass before these maladjustments were ironed out by alloca-
tions according to successive cost completion estimates.
Congress specified that geometric and construction stan-
dards be adopted for the Interstate System and approved by
the Secretary of Commerce in cooperation with the State
highway departments. Congress further stated that the
standards should be adequate for the completed Interstate
System to accommodate the types and volumes of traffic fore-
cast for 1975. This year was used because the bill leading
to the 1956 Act was written in 1955, and twenty years from
the date of construction was the commonly used design year.
Recognizing the limitation of a fixed design year in a long
continuing program, Congress subsequently revised the re-
quirement to twenty years from the date of construction plan
approval. Uniformly applied design standards were necessary
to assure equity in the needs formula method of apportioning
funds between the states. The Federal Aid Highway Act of
1956 called for the first completion cost estimate by February
1, 1959. Subsequent highway acts specified the dates that
successive estimates were to be presented to Congress.
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Federal Share . The States were traditionally re-
quired to match federal aid on a 50-50 basis, except for
concessions to States with large areas of Federal land.
In 1954 the matching requirement for the Interstate System
was changed to 60 percent Federal - 40 percent State in
light of the national importance of the Interstate System.
In line with the recommendations of the President's Advisory
Committee on a National Highway Program, the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1956 increased the Federal share to ninety
percent of the total Interstate cost plus a portion of the
remaining ten percent of such cost in any State containing
unappropriated and unreserved public lands or nontaxable
Indian lands exceeding five percent of the total area of
the State, but not more than 95 percent of the total cost
of such an Interstate project. In effect, the matching
requirement for the Interstate System was now ninety percent
Federal - ten percent State.
Use of Funds . The 1956 Act authorized the appropriation
of $24,825 billion for the Interstate System over its thirteen
year life. With the $175 million already appropriated by
the 1954 Act, a total of $25 billion was appropriated for
the Interstate System as recommended by the President's
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program in the study
A 10-year National Highway Program . Subsequent highway acts
would increase and modify the apportionments over the life
of the Interstate Program.
Congress set forth several conditions on the use of
Interstate funds. As was true of apportionments for the
other systems, Interstate funds would be available for ex-
penditure for two years after the fiscal year for which it
was apportioned. If unexpended at the end of two fiscal
years, the funds would lapse. The lapsed amount could then
be reapportioned among other States. States would not be
allowed to let the 60-40 funds of the 1954 Act lapse to
substitute 90-10 funds of the 1956 Act.
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Although States were allowed to transfer twenty percent
of the fiscal year apportionment from one Federal Aid System
to another, Congress prohibited the diversion of funds from
the Interstate System.
In recognition of the fact that States might construct
portions of their Interstate System with State funds in
advance of the apportionment, the 1956 Act provided for
advance construction by arranging for later reimbursement
to the State for the Federal share of the cost whenever
additional funds were appropriated to that State. The
Secretary of Commerce had to approve the plans and specifi-
cations before advance construction (as was true of other
Interstate projects) and the advance construction project
had to conform to Interstate geometric and construction
standards. Advance construction would not increase the
amount apportioned to any State since the State was reim-
bursed out of future apportionments. Also, States who
undertook advance construction were not to be penalized in the
allocation of funds under the completion cost estimate for-
mula.
Interstate Use Restrictions . Congress prohibited the
construction of commercial establishments on the Interstate
to assure free competition of highway oriented services and
to prevent the deterioration of full-access control on the
System. However, air space above or below the facility
could be used for parking if it did not interfere with the
free flow of traffic. Subsequent laws would expand this
provision to allow any public or private use that did not
impair the highway. Any additional points of access or
egress from the System had to be approved by the Secretary
of Commerce. The prohibition of commercial use of the
Interstate right-of-way was to apply to all future construc-
tion on the Interstate but would not impair the agreements
made by State toll road authorities.
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To protect the Interstate from excessive loads, Congress
prohibited the authorization of appropriations to any State
if the Interstate could be lawfully used by vehicles in excess
of 18,000 pounds on any one axle, 32,000 pounds on a tandem
axle, 73,280 pounds gross weight or ninety-six inches in
width or corresponding maximum weights and dimensions per-
mitted for vehicles using public highways of a State in
effect on July 1, 1956, whichever was greater. Congress also
requested the Bureau of Public Roads to conduct tests de-
termining the maximum desirable dimensions and weights and
to report to Congress by March 1, 1959.
Adminstrative Policy . The 1956 Act did not alter the
basic Bureau of Public Roads relationship with the States.
The States were responsible for the initiation of all Inter-
state projects. Although the States determined the location
of the Interstate Routes and were responsible for design and
construction of the routes, these operations were subject to
the approval of the Bureau of Public Roads for both the
technical and financial arrangements, as was true of the
other Federal aid systems. The States were fully responsible
for planning their own Interstate program, for establishing
their own construction priorities, and for operating and
maintaining the Interstate System.
Congress specifically called for an accelerated highway
program because many highways were inadequate to meet the
needs of local and interstate commerce and the national and
civil defense. The most important objective of the highway
program was the completion of the Interstate System, and
Congress had requested a progress report by February 1, 1959
to evaluate the highway program. Congress also required the
State highway department to certify that a public hearing
was held (or the opportunity afforded) to consider the
economic effects of highway location for all Federal aid
projects involving the bypassing or transversing of an urban
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place. This provision was later expanded to cover rural
Federal aid projects and to include the consideration of
social and environmental effects of highway location. Finally,
the Congress enjoined the States to encourage the participa-
tion of small business enterprises in the construction of
the Interstate System.
Right-of-Way Acquisition . To aid those States without
adequate access control legislation or those States having
problems acquiring Interstate right-of-way, Congress provided
for legislation enabling the Federal government to exercise
its power of eminent domain in acquiring right-of-way or
access control for an Interstate project if requested by the
State. Upon transfer of the land or access control to the
State, the State would have to pay its share of the cost for
the land or access control as well as its share of the cost
of acquiring the land or access control. The Federal cost
of acquisition would be deducted from the Federal apportion-
ment of Interstate funds to the State. If the State lacked
access control legislation, the Federal government would
retain the outer five feet of right-of-way to control access
until the State passed access control legislation. Whenever
right-of-way, including access control, for the Interstate
System is required over Federal land, an agreement must be
concluded between the State and Secretary.
Because advance acquisition saves funds, reduces relo-
cation hardships and permits more orderly acquisition, the
1956 Act authorized the use of a State's apportionment for
advanced right-of-way acquisition, provided actual construc-
tion followed within five years. The Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1959 extended the limitation to seven years. The
funds advanced at the request of the State were placed in
a revolving trust fund. When the Federal government received
vouchers from the State verifying the purchase of right-of-
way and commencement of construction, the funds were disbursed.
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The advance from a State's apportionment was limited to a
maximum of one-quarter of the apportionment for a particular
year. The revolving fund would not alter the Federal share
of the project cost nor alter the Interstate apportionment
to the State on the basis of need.
Inclusion of Toll Roads in the Interstate System . In
the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956 Congress authorized the
Secretary to approve as a part of the Interstate System any
toll road, birdge or tunnel, now or hereafter constructed
which meets the standards adopted for the improvement of
projects located on the Interstate System, when such toll
road, bridge or tunnel is located on a route heretofore or
hereafter designated as part of the Interstate System. In
1968, a provision prohibited the construction of a toll road
on the Interstate System after June 30, 1968; however, the
Secretary could approve the construction of a toll road on
the Interstate System if the construction as a toll road
rather than a free road was in the public interest •
No Federal funds could be used for the construction of
a toll facility except under special circumstances. Federal
funds could be used on approaches to toll facilities as long
as the project had some use other than as a toll road approach
facility. For the Interstate System, Interstate funds could
be used on approaches to toll facilities although the project
had no use other than as an approach to the toll road, pro-
vided that the toll road would become free when the bonds
were liquidated and that reasonably satisfactory alternative
free routes were available to traffic wishing to bypass the
toll portion of the Interstate. The Federal Aid Highway
Act of 1970 allowed Federal participation in the reconstruction
and improvement of any two-lane toll road (which was designated
as part of the Interstate System on or before June 30, 1968)
to the geometric and construction standards of the Interstate
provided that no additional indebtedness was incurred, that
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the tolls less the actual cost of operation and maintenance
were applied to the repayment of the bonds, and that the
toll road became free once the bonds were liquidated.
On the recommendations of the States, 2,102 miles of
exisitng toll road (including the 157- mile Indiana Toll Road)
were included in the Interstate System as of August 21, 1957.
Reimbursement for Completed Interstate Sections . Sharp
controversy developed over the question of reimbursing the
States for Interstate projects (toll or free) built with less
than ninety per cent Federal aid funds. The House bill re-
commended reimbursement to the States for sections of the
Interstate built to Interstate standards so that States with
good highway programs would not be penalized. On the other
hand the Senate felt that the States who had built sections
of the Interstate prior to the new matching fund ratio were
deriving benefits from these routes because of their con-
struction and should not be reimbursed. In the Act of 1956,
Congress deferred the whole matter.
As requested by the 1956 Act, the Bureau of Public Roads
with the cooperation of the States reported to Congress on
January 7, 1958 on the matter of reimbursing the States for
highways completed or under construction on the Interstate
System between August 2, 1947 and June 30, 1957. Of the
38,548 miles of approved detailed locations of the Interstate
System, as of September of 1957, only 10,859 miles met the
criteria for consideration for reimbursement. To be considered,
the sections of highway had to be in reasonable compliance
with Interstate standards. It would-be economically unsound
to construct a new highway so close to one already in exist-
ance which was deficient to a small degree according to
Interstate standards.
The mileage under consideration included 1,950 miles of
toll road in twenty-six States and 8,909 miles of free road
in forty-seven States of which only 1,955- miles were fully
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completed. The total cost of the highways eligible for reim-
bursement amounted to $6.09 billion, with $2.59 billion for
toll roads and $3.5 billion for free roads. Federal aid
funds had been used for thirty-two percent of the latter.
Thirty-seven percent of the cost was for work under con-
struction or awarded for construction on June 30, 1957; thirty
percent of the cost was for work completed for less than two
years; and thirty- three percent of the cost represented work
completed for two to ten years. Considering depreciation,
the cost of reimbursement amounted to $5.92 billion.
Since the presentation of the reimbursement study, sev-
eral bills have been introduced in the Congress, and many
hearings have been held. "The bills generally have proposed
reimbursing the States with an amount of money or system
mileage equivalent to the cost of the State built toll and
free sections incorporated in the Interstate System." Under
these reimbursement plans, the toll roads would remain part
of the system and would continue to operate as toll roads
until the bonds were liquidated; Federal money would not be
used for bond retirement since the reimbursement money could
only be spent for the construction of other highways. However,
Congress has never taken action on reimbursement. Its members
have felt that the planned Interstate System should be com-
pleted first before reimbursement was considered. Financing
the reimbursement was also a major problem in any reimburse-
ment plan because no funds were available in the Federal
Highway Trust Fund for that purpose.
Other Provisions . The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956
extended the minimum wage requirements to all Interstate
Projects as set forth in the Davis-Bacon Act. The Davis-
Bacon Act was later extended to all Federal aid highway
projects. In the 1956 Act, Federal funds could be used to
reimburse a State for utility relocation costs which the
State had to pay under its own laws and for archaeological
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and palenotological salvage. The 1956 Act also expanded the
Interstate length limitation by 1000 miles because of the
need for circumferentials in urban areas.
Subsequent Federal highway acts added new regulations,
standards and requirements to the Interstate. These are
described in the evolution of policies and standards in the
next chapter.
Indiana Motor Vehicle Fund
When the Indiana State Highway Commission was created
in 1917, operating revenue was derived from inheritance and
the General Fund of the State. The new Indiana Highway Act
of 1919 required that all funds collected from motor vehicle
registrations and licenses were to be used for highway deve-
lopment. In 1923 the legislative enacted the first gasoline
tax law providing for a tax of two cents per gallon. The
revenue from the gas tax proved to be insufficient, and the
tax was raised to three cents per gallon in 1925. In 1929,
the gasoline tax was raised to four cents per gallon with
three- fourths of the revenue going to the Indiana State
Highway Commission and one-fourth to the counties and cities.
An apportionment act in 1932 reduced the Indiana State Highway
Commission share to one half.
All highway related taxes (registration and licenses
fees, fuel taxes, weight taxes, etc.) were consolidated in
a single account in 1937, creating the Indiana Motor Vehicle
Highway Account. This account was similar to the Federal
Highway Trust Fund in some aspects. After deducting the
expenses of collection, a small portion to police highways,
the diversion of $1,250,000 to the State General Fund and
$2,000,000 which went to cities and towns, one-third of the
remainder went to the counties; and the balance went to the
Indiana State Highway Commission. Legislation in 1941 con-
tinued to devert $1,250,000 to the State General Fund,
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increased the share of the cities and towns to $3,000,000,
allocated $12,200,000 to the counties, and appropriated the
remainder to the Indiana State Highway Commission.
With the advent of gasoline rationing during the Second
World War, revenues began to drop, and the diversion to the
State General Fund was stopped in 1943. When revenues were
insufficient to continue operations, emergency legislation
was enacted in 1945 to provide monies from the General Fund.
This legislation was repealed in 1947 after the crisis.
The current formula for allocating revenues from the
Motor Vehicle Highway Account was enacted in 1949. After
the expenses of collection and an operating cost of the
State Police Department are deducted, the Indiana State
Highway Commission received fifty-three percent; the counties,
thirty- two percent; and the cities and towns, fifteen percent.
When the Interstate Program began in 1956, Indiana
lacked sufficient funds to match the Federal authorizations.
Not until the State gas tax was raised to six cents per
gallon in 1957 was Indiana able to obligate a substantial
portion of the Interstate apportionments. Because the
Interstate Program brought about a dramatic increase in the
level of operations, the low level of funding and operations
prior to 1956 resulted in a slow start on the Indiana Inter-
state Program. Since 1957, Indiana has had sufficient
matching funds to obligate the Federal aid apportionments.
Currently, the State gasoline tax for Indiana is six
cents plus a two-cent per gallon bonus tax, and the Federal
gasoline tax is four cents per gallon. The two-cent per
gallon bonus tax was enacted for the "Killer Highway" Program.
Fifty-five percent of the bonus tax goes to the Indiana
State Highway Commission and forty-five percent to the
Arterial Road and Street Board. The Indiana State Highway
Commission has utilized its share of the bonus tax to dual
lane the major inter-urban routes of the State, such as US41,
SR37, US31, US30, US24, SR63 and other major highways.
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